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PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY
JOHN F. STINNEFORD*
ABSTRACT
For more than half a century, academic commentators have criticized
the Supreme Court for failing to articulate a substantive constitutional
conception of criminal law. Although the Court enforces various
procedural protections that the Constitution provides for criminal
defendants, it has left the question of what a crime is purely to the
discretion of the legislature. This failure has permitted legislatures to
evade the Constitution’s procedural protections by reclassifying crimes as
civil causes of action, eliminating key elements (such as mens rea) or
reclassifying them as defenses or sentencing factors, and authorizing severe
punishments for crimes traditionally considered relatively minor.
The Supreme Court’s inability to place meaningful constitutional
limits on this aspect of legislative power is often described as a failure of
courage or will. This Article will demonstrate that it is actually a failure of
memory. Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence was animated by two traditional common law ideas: (1) that
there are real moral limits to what the government can do, and (2) that the
most reliable way to tell whether the government has transgressed those
limits is to analyze the challenged action in light of longstanding practice.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court rejected these
ideas in favor of instrumentalism, an approach to jurisprudence that sees
law as a mere instrument through which government experts can solve
social problems in light of new scientific insights. As a result, for several
decades the Court seemed to approve a limitless legislative power to define
and punish crime, which the Court treated as just another form of
regulation.
This approach did not last. Criminal law does not merely regulate: it
imposes moral condemnation on the offender in the name of the community.
*
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In recent decades, the Supreme Court’s constitutional criminal
jurisprudence has moved toward reassertion of the old common law
constraints, imposing either moral or precedential limits on the power of
the legislature to define and punish crime. But because the Court no longer
understands the relationship between morality and tradition, these efforts
have mostly failed. This Article will suggest that the only way to develop a
constitutional criminal jurisprudence that is coherent, just, and duly
respectful of the legislature’s primacy in defining and punishing crime is to
return to the common law synthesis of morality and tradition that underlies
the constitutional law of crime.
I. INTRODUCTION1
You are a UPS delivery truck driver in Tampa, Florida. Your job
involves picking up packages at a central warehouse, loading them onto
your truck, and delivering them to various offices and homes on your
delivery route. Every Friday, you deliver a package weighing a couple of
pounds to a particular residence on your route. The residence is located in a
“bad” neighborhood where there is a lot of crime, particularly drug crime.
The person who signs for the package every week is a tough-looking
character, and there are usually several other tough-looking characters in
the background. While on your way to make the delivery one Friday, you
are stopped by the Tampa police. They seize the package from the back of
your truck, open it, and discover one kilogram of cocaine. You are charged
with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a crime punishable by
fifteen years in prison.2 To convict you of this crime, prosecutors are not
required to prove that you knew the package contained cocaine or any other
illicit substance. All they have to prove is that you possessed it and
intended to deliver it.3 You do have the right to raise lack of knowledge as
an affirmative defense—but the burden rests on you.4

1

This Article is part of a series intended to specify the proper interpretation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause and explore its relation to criminal law doctrine. See John
F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality];
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to
Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original
Meaning of Unusual].
2
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West 2000).
3
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.101(2) (West Supp. 2011) (“The Legislature finds that
knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense
under this chapter.”).
4
Id. (“Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative
defense to the offenses of this chapter.”).
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A reader of this hypothetical scenario—at least a reader who has a
passing familiarity with criminal law—is likely to think that this statute
violates the Constitution in three ways. First, it permits the state to impose
criminal punishment on someone who acts reasonably, in good faith, and
with no knowledge of the facts that make his conduct wrongful, a result that
seems to violate the Due Process Clause’s requirement of fundamental
fairness.5 Second, it requires the defendant to disprove a key element of the
offense,6 thus inverting the requirement that the state must prove all
elements beyond a reasonable doubt—again in violation of the Due Process
Clause.7 Third, it authorizes a very harsh punishment—up to fifteen years
in prison—for a crime that can be committed with complete moral
innocence, thus violating the proportionality requirements of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.8
In reality, the answer is not as clear as it seems. 9 The Supreme Court
has said that criminal statutes that authorize punishment without culpability,
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, or authorize disproportionate
punishments might violate the Constitution.10 But the Court has also upheld
criminal statutes that do precisely these things.11 To the extent there is any
pattern to the Court’s treatment of these matters, it has been a pattern of
advance and retreat: the Court announces a constitutional rule to protect
criminal defendants, but then pulls back when faced with the implications
5
Cf. Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877) (“All punitive legislation
contemplates some relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict the latter where the
former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”).
6
See State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 423 (Fla. 2012) (holding that it was not
“improper[]” under Florida Statutes § 893.101(2) to give defendant the burden of disproving
knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance because such knowledge was
legislatively defined as an affirmative defense rather than an element).
7
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt).
8
See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
9
See Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a
habeas challenge to Florida Statutes § 893.101(2) on the ground that the constitutional law
governing this issue was not sufficiently clear: “One very general principle can be distilled
from the [Supreme] Court’s cases in this area: legislatures have ‘wide latitude . . . to declare
an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition,’ but they
still must ‘act within any applicable constitutional constraints’ when defining the elements of
a criminal offenses [sic]. The Court has not drawn lines around this principle sufficient to
dictate a particular result of the Florida court here . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 424 n.6 (1985))); Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 423 (upholding the constitutionality of Florida
Statutes § 893.101(2)).
10
See infra Parts IV.B.4, IV.D, V–VI.
11
See infra Parts II.C, V–VI.
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of the rule it has announced. Scholars have observed (and complained
about) this fact for more than half a century,12 but like the Court itself they
have been unable to diagnose the source of the problem or propose an
effective solution.
This Article will argue that the Supreme Court’s inability to resolve
questions of constitutional criminal law is the result of the instrumentalist
revolution, a movement in legal thought that sought to delegitimize
morality and tradition as sources of legal standards and replace them with
values of power and efficiency.
Prior to the instrumentalist revolution, American legal thought was
animated by two core common law ideas: first, that there are real moral
limits to what the government can do, and second, that the most reliable
way to tell whether the government has transgressed those limits is to
analyze the challenged action in light of longstanding practice or tradition.13
In other words, tradition was a guide to the application of moral principles
in practice. It helped show which moral principles were relevant to a given
case, how they were to be balanced against competing principles, and how
they were to be applied to a given set of facts. This common law synthesis
of morality and tradition was built into the various parts of the United States
Constitution that related to crime, most explicitly the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.14
Instrumentalism rejected the common law synthesis of morality and
tradition.15 It denied that the law contains any predetermined constraints on
12
See Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958) (“If one were to judge from the notions apparently underlying many judicial opinions,
and the overt language even of some of them, the solution of the puzzle is simply that a
crime is anything which is called a crime. . . . So vacant a concept is a betrayal of
intellectual bankruptcy.”); see also, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325,
1374–75 (1979); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.
107 (1962); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (1996) (“Legislatures decide what is and is not a crime, just as
they decide what (mostly civil) rules apply to sales contracts or securities offerings. . . . But
courts alone decide what the law of criminal procedure looks like, since courts are the
system’s constitutional lawmakers and criminal procedure is the province of constitutional
law.”); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An
Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REV. 775, 791 & n.112
(1975). But see Louis Bilionis, Process, The Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1278–79 (1998) (criticizing Henry Hart’s claim that the move
toward strict liability crimes subverts the core purposes of the criminal law and stating that
“[c]riminal law is not nearly the stickler for individualized moral blameworthiness that Hart
mythicized”).
13
See infra Part II.A.
14
See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1.
15
See infra Part II.B.
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the ends the legislature may pursue or the means through which it may
choose to achieve them. With respect to the criminal law, this meant that
punishment could be used purely as a form of regulation and that traditional
culpability-based constraints on criminal punishment should no longer
apply.
The instrumentalist claim that “crime” is whatever the legislature says
it is conflicts with the United States Constitution. The Constitution imposes
a wide variety of limits on government power that only apply in criminal
cases, including rights to indictment and trial by jury, prohibitions of ex
post facto laws and double jeopardy, and protection against cruel and
unusual punishments. These limits presuppose a substantive constitutional
definition of crime; otherwise they would be meaningless. A legislature
could always evade them simply by reclassifying a criminal statute as civil.
The Supreme Court became aware of this problem by the middle of the
twentieth century. Since that time, it has made repeated efforts to draw a
constitutional line between criminal and civil causes of action,16 to impose
culpability-based limits on the legislature’s power to define crimes,17 and to
require proportionality in punishment.18 These efforts failed, however,
primarily because of the continuing impact of instrumentalism. Although
instrumentalism did not succeed in eliminating either morality or tradition
from the legal system, it did largely succeed in breaking the connection
between the two.
As the Supreme Court sought to rebuild the constitutional law of crime
in the wake of the instrumentalist revolution, it returned to common law
ideas about morality and tradition—but it now kept the two largely separate
from each other. In cases involving the criminal–civil distinction, the Court
used tradition in isolation from morality, looking at the outcomes in prior
cases but failing to examine why those outcomes were reached. The
emptiness of this approach has led the Court to accept the civil or criminal
label the legislature put on the statute in virtually every case. 19 In cases
involving legislative redefinition of crime, on the other hand, the Court tried
to apply moral principle unmediated by tradition. This effort threatened to
sweep aside vast areas of traditional criminal law doctrine, and the Court
retreated as soon as the implications of its effort became clear.20 Finally,
the Court’s efforts at requiring proportionality in punishment have been
defined by a struggle between originalists who rely upon an artificially

16
17
18
19
20

See infra Part III.
See infra Parts IV–V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, V.
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narrow view of tradition and nonoriginalists who employ a subjective and
unconstrained vision of morality.21 As a result, the Court’s proportionality
jurisprudence has largely been a dead letter outside the death penalty
context.22
In the wake of this failure, the Supreme Court has recently started to
recreate the common law synthesis of morality and tradition, albeit in a
radically incomplete fashion. The Supreme Court’s recent cases involving
the criminal–civil distinction have increasingly recognized that the key
difference between criminal and civil laws is that criminal laws employ
sanctions as an expression of blame.23 The Court’s cases involving
legislative redefinition of crime have increasingly drawn upon tradition to
shed light on the scope and limitations of the moral culpability
requirement.24 The Court’s proportionality cases, on the other hand, remain
largely unprincipled.25
Although the Supreme Court appears to have restarted a process of
common law adjudication that could lead to the recovery of a coherent
constitutional doctrine of substantive criminal law, many of its decisions are
predicated on statutory construction or on constitutional doctrines only
loosely related to culpability. In several areas, the Court still maintains an
almost impenetrable wall of deference to the legislature that prevents the
development of any doctrine that might provide meaningful protection to
criminal defendants. In short, until the Court returns fully to the common
law synthesis of morality and tradition, embodied most specifically in the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the constitutional law of crime will
remain radically incomplete.
Part II of this Article will describe the rise of instrumentalism and
show how it shattered the bond between morality and tradition that made
constitutional criminal law possible. Part III will show the Court’s efforts
21

This conflict replayed itself once again in a case decided this past Term. Compare
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (“We view [the proportionality requirement
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] less through a historical prism than according
to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), with id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“As I have previously explained, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally
understood as prohibiting torturous methods of punishment—specifically methods akin to
those that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
The clause does not contain a ‘proportionality principle.’”) (emphasis, citations, and internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas’s claim that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was not originally understood to forbid disproportionate punishments is incorrect.
See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 1, at 926–60.
22
See infra Part VI.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Parts IV.D and V.
25
See infra Part VI.

2012]

PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY

659

in the aftermath of the instrumentalist revolution to use tradition without
morality as a basis for distinguishing civil and criminal statutes, as well as
the Court’s currently emerging recognition that the true difference lies in a
statute’s retributive purpose. Part IV will describe the Court’s effort to
invalidate statutes that authorize punishment without culpability, its retreat
from this effort, and its eventual decision to use statutory interpretation to
protect the values underlying the culpability principle in most federal cases.
Part V will show how the same pattern played out in the Court’s elemental
manipulation cases. In this context, the Court tried to prevent legislatures
from redefining elements of crimes as affirmative defenses or sentencing
factors in order to evade the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Recently, the Court has engaged in a more limited effort to prevent
elemental manipulation in a series of cases focusing on sentencing factors
and the right to a jury trial. Part VI will show how a similar pattern played
out in the context of proportionality in punishment. The Court struck down
several statutes on the ground that the punishments they authorized were
excessive in relation to the offender’s culpability, but it retreated amid
concerns about usurping the proper role of the legislature. Over the last
decade, the Court has revived proportionality review in a narrow class of
cases involving the death penalty and life sentences for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders. But the Court lacks a principled basis for its
decisions, and its enforcement of the proportionality requirement is
incomplete and disingenuous. Part VII will provide a brief conclusion.
II. CULPABILITY AND THE SHIFT FROM COMMON LAW MORAL REALISM TO
LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM
A decade prior to the American Revolution, William Blackstone
asserted that it was unjust to impose punishment without culpability. He
wrote that “punishments are . . . only inflicted for [the] abuse of . . . free
will,”26 and that “an unwarrantable act without a vitious will is no crime at
all.”27 This view of the criminal law was universally held for more than
five hundred years, dating back at least as far as medieval jurist Henry de
Bracton.28 As late as 1877, the United States Supreme Court implied that it
was beyond the authority of government to punish even knowing violations
of a criminal statute where such violations were committed in good faith
26

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27.
Id. at *21.
28
See 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans. & ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 1300) (“[C]rimen non contrahitur nisi
voluntas nocendi intercedat. Et voluntas et propositum distinguunt maleficia . . . .”
(translated as “[A] crime is not committed unless the intention to injure exists[.] It is will
and purpose which mark maleficia . . . .”)).
27
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and with no “evil intent”: “All punitive legislation contemplates some
relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict the latter where the
former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”29
By 1922, however, the Supreme Court had virtually abandoned the
culpability requirement, treating it as the antiquated relic of a quaint,
bygone era. In United States v. Balint, the Court held that it would no
longer read all criminal statutes to require proof of a guilty mind,
particularly where the “emphasis of the statute is . . . upon achievement of
some social betterment.”30 By 1943, the Supreme Court claimed that the
culpability requirement was an obstacle to making the criminal law “a
working instrument of government,”31 at least where the criminal law
concerned public health.
This change in the Supreme Court’s attitude had many causes. It has
often been described as a response to the industrial revolution and the rise
of the regulatory state.32 But as will be shown immediately below, the
Court’s rejection of the culpability principle in the first half of the twentieth
century flowed most directly from the instrumentalist revolution, which
rejected the common law emphasis on moral realism and tradition in favor
29

Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877). In Felton, the defendants knowingly
violated a statute regulating liquor production, but did so to avoid the complete loss of the
liquor being produced. Id. at 702. The purpose of the statute, which was to ensure the
collection of federal taxes, see id. at 701–02, was not frustrated by the defendants’ conduct
(in fact, it was furthered by their decision to prevent the destruction of the liquor). Thus
their conduct was justified under the doctrine of necessity or choice of evils. Given this fact,
the Court held that their conduct could not be characterized as “willful” within the meaning
of the statute. Id. at 702. But the Court used language that went beyond mere statutory
interpretation, implying that punishment for objectively justified conduct would be
fundamentally unjust.
30
258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
31
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
32
See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253–54 (1952) (describing the rise
of strict liability crimes as resulting from the following causes: “The industrial revolution
multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury from increasingly powerful and
complex mechanisms, driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher
precautions by employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to
subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to observe
new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called
for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of
goods became an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed food,
drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable standards of quality,
integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and
detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries,
trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare.”); Francis Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 68 (1933) (“[T]he growing complexities of
twentieth century life have demanded an increasing social regulation; and for this purpose
the existing machinery of the criminal law has been seized upon and utilized.”).
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of a belief in scientism and expertise as the best solution to all forms of
social problem. Although instrumentalism’s grip on the Supreme Court’s
constitutional criminal jurisprudence loosened by the middle of the
twentieth century, the common law bond between morality and tradition
had already been shattered. This shattering made it virtually impossible for
the Court to provide coherent answers to questions of constitutional
criminal law.
A. THE COMMON LAW, MORAL REALISM, AND TRADITION

Today we are used to seeing the common law as Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. described it: a body of rules made by judges exercising a
“legislative function” and acting with a view to “what is expedient for the
community concerned.”33 This is not how the common law was seen for
most of its history. Rather, it was seen as a kind of customary law, a law of
“custom” and “long usage.”34 Judges in common law cases were to look to
precedents to discern the customs relevant to a given case and then apply
those customs to the facts before them.
Common law thinkers argued that the customary nature of the
common law gave it two primary advantages over both legislation and royal
or executive decree. First, because custom arose from long usage rather
than the command of the sovereign, common law rules were thought to
enjoy the consent of the people. If the people rejected a given custom, it
would fall out of usage over time and would cease to have any legal
authority.35
Second, the customary nature of the common law was thought to
ensure that it comported with principles of reason. Common law thinkers
were moral realists. They believed that real moral principles inhered in
nature and that such principles could be discerned by reason. Laws that
failed to comport with moral reality were not truly “law” but were mere acts
of power or violence.36 Common law thinkers did not claim, however, that
33

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35–36 (Dover, 1991) (1881).
See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1, at 1766–1814.
35
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74 (asserting that customary laws
supported by long usage possessed “internal evidence of freedom,” for they arose through
“the voluntary consent of the people”); EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630),
as reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 701 (Steve
Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS] (“Customes are defined to be a
Law . . . which being established by long use, and the consent of our Ancestors, hath been,
and is daily practised.”).
36
See, e.g., 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608) [hereinafter
COKE, INSTITUTES], as reprinted in 2 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 35, § 69, at 684
(“[N]othing that is contrarie to reason, is consonant to Law.”); id. § 138, at 701 (“[R]eason is
the life of the Law, nay the common Law it selfe is nothing else but reason.”); 1
34
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moral principles could easily be identified in the abstract and applied to
given cases. At any given time, an individual judge engaging in abstract
moral reasoning might get the moral principle wrong, might fail to weigh it
properly against competing principles, or might fail to apply it properly to
the facts of a given case. The common law was thought to minimize these
risks because it presented to judges an intergenerational consensus about
the application of moral principles in practice. Prior cases revealed which
moral principles were relevant to a given issue, how they were to be
balanced against each other, and how they were to be applied in specific
factual situations. Though any one person might make a mistake, the
consensus of multiple generations was likely to reach a just conclusion.
The great common law jurist Edward Coke compared the development
of the common law to the refinement of gold in a fire: “[I]f all the reason
that is dispersed into so many severall heads were united into one, yet could
not make such a Law as the Law of England is, because by many
successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite number of
grave and learned men, and by long experience growne to such a perfection,
for the government of this Realme . . . .”37 As this description implies, the
common law was not seen as a static system of unchanging rules. Rather, it
represented a process of legal development. Through case-by-case
adjudication over a long period of time, customs that were truly just and
reasonable would survive and develop, while those that were not would fall
away.
Coke’s analogy between the common law and the refinement of gold
also provided the basis for a theory of fundamental law. Over time, as the
common law “refined” the law, it revealed certain principles and practices
that could not be changed by the government without profound injustice.
Such principles and practices constituted the fundamental law upon which
the English Constitution was based. Sometimes fundamental law imposed
affirmative obligations on the government. For example, in 1673 Chief
Justice John Vaughan of the Court of Common Pleas opined that the
government is required to punish certain serious crimes, such as “murther
BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *70 (“[O]ur lawyers are with justice so copious in their
encomiums on the reason of the common law; . . . the law is the perfection of reason, . . . it
always intends to conform thereto, and . . . what is not reason is not law.”); 7 EDWARD COKE,
Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati, in REPORTS (1608), as reprinted in 1 COKE,
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 166 (asserting that “the Law of Nature is part of the
Law of England”).
37
1 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 36, § 138, at 701. According to Edward Corwin, the
claim that “immemorial usage” is “superior to human rulemaking” goes back at least to the
classical period in Greece and is found in English common law thinking as early as the
fourteenth century. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE ‘HIGHER LAW’ BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6, 26 (1955).
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[sic], stealing, perjury, trespass,” and that any statute legalizing such
conduct would itself be void.38 More commonly, fundamental law
restricted the government’s power to use coercive force against individuals,
particularly in criminal cases. Many of these restrictions provided
procedural rights to criminal defendants, including the right to due process
of law,39 indictment by grand jury,40 trial by jury in the vicinage of the
offense,41 habeas corpus,42 and the right not to be subjected to double
jeopardy.43 Some of these rights, however, were clearly substantive in
nature. For example, the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments implied a substantive limit to the state’s power to punish.44
With respect to the criminal law, the most basic limit on the
government’s power was the prohibition of punishment without culpability.
This prohibition was reflected in a whole variety of substantive criminal
law doctrines. The mens rea doctrine required the prosecution to prove that
the defendant had a blameworthy state of mind before convicting him of a
crime.45 The actus reus doctrine required proof of a voluntary act, since a
person cannot be blamed for involuntary actions such as reflexes.46 Those
who were too young47 or too mentally ill48 to exercise the power of free
choice could not be criminally punished; nor could a person who violated
the law due to a reasonable, good faith mistake of fact49 or in order to avoid

38

Thomas v. Sorrell, (1673) 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102 (C.P.).
2 COKE, INSTITUTES (1642), supra note 36, ch. 29, at 858–59.
40
Id. at 858.
41
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *349–50.
42
Id. at *129; 2 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 36, at 862–64; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
41, at *129.
43
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *335; EDWARD COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8
REPORTS [hereinafter COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case], reprinted in 1 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 35, at 277 (articulating the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy: “Nemo
debit bis puniri pro uno delicto . . . . Deus non agit bis in idipsum.”).
44
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *379.
45
See 3 COKE, INSTITUTES (1644), supra note 36, ch. 1, at 961 (“[A]ctus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea”: The act does not make one guilty unless the mind is also guilty.).
46
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *20–21 (noting that involuntary actions cannot
“induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid
the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or
culpable”).
47
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *22 (“Infants under the age of discretion, ought
not to be punished by any criminal prosecution whatever.”).
48
See id. at *24 (“[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if
committed when under these incapacities . . . .”).
49
Id. at *27 (“[W]hen a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is
unlawful[,] . . . there is not that conjunction between [the deed and the will] which is
necessary to form a criminal act.”).
39
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a greater evil.50 A person who committed a crime due to threats of death or
bodily harm could raise a limited defense of compulsion, because he
committed the crime unwillingly.51 A person could not be punished for
killing in self-defense, for “the law of nature . . . [has] made him his own
protector.”52
B. THE COMMON LAW, THE CRIMINAL LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION

Although there was broad agreement in England about the normative
power of the common law—particularly in its capacity as fundamental
law—it was not entirely clear what would happen if the common law came
into conflict with the actual power of Parliament. Coke himself, for
example, sometimes seemed to assert that that common law could “void” an
unreasonable act of Parliament,53 but at other times seemed to claim that
Parliament possessed “ultimate wisdom,” and thus would never pass a
fundamentally unreasonable law.54 By the late eighteenth century,
however, it was abundantly clear that Parliament could and did pass laws
that were contrary to fundamental common law principles. After the civil
wars, regicide, abdications, and revolutions of the seventeenth century,
England moved to a system of parliamentary supremacy in the eighteenth
century.55 The ascendancy of Parliament gave rise to an increasing number
of laws that ran contrary to basic common law principles. The most famous
example of this phenomenon was the “bloody code,” a set of laws that
imposed the death penalty for more than 150 crimes, including crimes as
minor as cutting down a cherry tree in an orchard.56 Orthodox English

50

See id. at *30–31.
See id. at *27 (“As punishments are therefore only inflicted for that abuse of that free
will, which God has given to a man, it is highly just and equitable that a man should be
excused for those acts, which are done through unavoidable force and compulsion.”). This
defense did not excuse homicide, however, “for he ought rather to die himself, than escape
by the murder of an innocent.” Id. at *30.
52
Id. at *30.
53
See COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case, as reprinted in 1 COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra
note 35, at 275 (“[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and adjudge
such Act to be void . . . .”).
54
4 COKE, INSTITUTES (1644), supra note 36, ch. 1, at 1067 (“[I]n the politique body
when the King and the Lords Spirituall and Temporall, Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, are
all by the Kings command assembled and joyned together under the head in consultation for
the common good of the whole Realm, there is ultimum Sapientiae.”).
55
See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1, at 1782.
56
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *4.
51
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jurists such as Blackstone deplored the injustice of these laws,57 but also
opined that Parliament had unchallengeable authority to enact them.58
Importantly, Americans took precisely the opposite position. They
described royal and parliamentary actions that violated fundamental
principles of justice embodied in the common law as “injuries and
usurpations.”59 In fact, Americans justified revolt against England largely
on the basis of Parliament’s violation of their common law rights.60 When
the United States Constitution was adopted a decade after the revolution,
various common law protections were written into the text. Many of these
were protections for criminal defendants, designed to prevent punishment
without culpability. Defendants were given the rights to be indicted by a
grand jury,61 to be tried by a petit jury,62 to confront witnesses,63 to
subpoena witnesses,64 and to have the assistance of counsel.65 Defendants
were also given the right not to be subjected to ex post facto laws,66 to

57

See id. at *17 (“[S]anguinary laws are a bad symptom of the distemper in any state. . . .
[T]hat magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon, who cuts off every
limb, which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure.”).
58
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 160 (“[Parliament] hath sovereign and
uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing,
reviving, and expounding of laws . . . : this being the place where that absolute despotic
power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution.”).
59
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For a discussion of the
relationship between the Declaration of Independence and the common law, see Stinneford,
Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1, at 1797–98.
60
In the run-up to the American Revolution, Americans frequently argued that
Parliament had violated their natural rights as reflected in the common law. For example, in
the first Continental Congress, Richard Henry Lee claimed that American rights “are built
upon a fourfold foundation, namely natural law, the British constitution, the charters of the
several colonies, and ‘immemorial usage.’” John Adams, Notes of Debates (Sept. 8, 1774),
in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 46 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976).
Roger Sherman asserted that American rights were based on the common law: “The
Colonies adopt the common Law, not as the common Law, but as the highest Reason.” Id. at
47. The 1774 Declaration and Resolves of the Continental Congress stated that American
rights were based on “the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English
constitution, and the several charters or compacts” of the various colonies; that the colonists
retained the “rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural born subjects, within the
realm of England”; and that these rights included the right to “the common law of England.”
DECLARATIONS AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Oct. 14, 1774),
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp.
61
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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double jeopardy,67 or to cruel and unusual punishments.68 These provisions
made it harder to convict the innocent, forbade punishment for conduct that
was legal when committed, and prohibited multiple or excessive
punishments.
Taken together, they were supposed to ensure that
punishment is not imposed in the absence or in excess of culpability.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention substantive
limits to Congress’s power to define crime, the various provisions listed
above—especially the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause—imply such
a limit.69 On the few occasions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries when legislatures passed laws that authorized punishment without
culpability, courts did not hesitate to declare such laws unconstitutional.
For example, in Ely v. Thompson, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
it would be unconstitutional under a state analogue to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause to punish a person for exercising the common
law right of self-defense, even though the criminal statute purported to
permit such punishment.70 Similarly, in Jones v. Commonwealth, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that abrogation of the common
law rule prohibiting imposition of a joint fine in a criminal case would be
cruel and unusual because it could require some defendants to bear the
punishment for others.71 As noted above, as late as 1877, the United States
Supreme Court refused to read a federal criminal statute to authorize
punishment of a person who acted reasonably and in good faith, even
though the defendant knowingly violated the criminal statute. Punishment
without culpability “would shock the sense of justice of every one.”72
All this changed by the 1920s. The reasons for this change are
discussed immediately below.

67

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69
This silence may have resulted from the fact that neither Parliament nor colonial or
state governments had previously attempted to violate fundamental common law rules
regarding the definition of crimes. Many of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights—for
example, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases—arguably made it into
the Constitution because of prior governmental attempts to violate them. See, e.g.,
Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1, at 1796 (discussing American
reaction against British attempts to avoid colonial juries by moving cases into the Admiralty
Court); id. at 1802 (describing Antifederalist concern that the federal government would
attempt to circumvent jury trials).
70
10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 70–73 (1820).
71
5 Va. (1 Call) 555 (1799).
72
Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877).
68

2012]

PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY

667

C. INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE REJECTION OF MORAL TRADITION

The period after the Civil War marked a turning point in American
legal thought. The reasons for the change were both social and intellectual.
The Civil War was a profoundly traumatic event that left many participants
(including the young Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.) skeptical of any claims
about a connection between morality and law.73 This skepticism was
bolstered by the increasingly influential writings of Charles Darwin and
Herbert Spencer, whose ideas of natural selection and survival of the fittest
challenged the notion that fundamental principles of justice even exist.74
During this same time period, an explosion in population and in
manufacturing activity occurred, at least in the North. For many people
community life became more anonymous and impersonal, and relationships
between employers and employees became more distant.75 Common law
doctrines of contract and tort appeared inadequate to deal with the
imbalanced bargaining power and the numerous accidents associated with
an industrial economy.76 For both theoretical and practical reasons, it was
increasingly argued that the best measure of a law’s goodness was
efficiency, not justice.
These changes are reflected in Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s famous
article, “The Path of the Law,” published in the Harvard Law Review in
1897. The primary goal of this article was to delegitimize morality and
tradition as bases for law and to replace them with the values of power and
efficiency. Holmes argued that law is really nothing more than the result of
a “concealed, half conscious battle” among competing interests.77 The
point of judging was to give effect to the will of the victors in the most
straightforward and efficient way possible.78 Morality and tradition were
obstacles to what Holmes considered “rational policy” because they focused
judicial attention on irrelevancies.79 Thus Holmes wanted to ban “every
word of moral significance” from the law and to eviscerate the role of
tradition in legal analysis80: “I look forward to a time when the part played
73
See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 41–51 (2000); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A
STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 69 (2001).
74
See, e.g., ALSCHULER, supra note 73, at 9, 49; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS
TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 38–39 (2006).
75
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253–54 (1952).
76
See, e.g., Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
77
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
78
Thus Holmes described judicial decisions as “do[ing] no more than embody[ing] the
preference of a given body in a given time and place.” Id. at 466.
79
See id. at 472.
80
Id. at 464.
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by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of
ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought
to be attained and the reasons for desiring them.”81 In other words, “the
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”82
Holmes applied the “cynical acid” of his argument directly to the
question of criminal punishment, arguing that the sole focus of the criminal
law should be “the dangerousness of the criminal,” not his culpability.83
Holmes noted approvingly that “well known men of science” believed that
“the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as
deep seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite.”84
If this turned out to be true, Holmes argued, then criminals (like
rattlesnakes) “must be got rid of.”85 If, on the other hand, the “well known
men of science” turned out to be wrong, something short of extermination
might be justifiable if it adequately deterred criminal conduct.86 Deterrence
and extermination were the only two rational alternatives. Traditional
moral ideas, such as the principle that punishment in excess of culpability is
unjust, were deliberately excluded from his analysis.
Although this rejection of morality was grounded largely in Holmes’s
own nihilism, progressive reformers in the first decades of the twentieth
century saw it as a path of liberation. For example, John Dewey saw
Holmes’s argument as a basis for furthering the interests of the labor
movement in their struggle against the interests of capital.87 Dewey
followed Holmes in arguing that “the essence of all law” is “coercion” and
that the only measure of a law’s goodness lay in “the relative efficiency and
economy of the expenditure of force as a means to an end.”88 This rationale
justified increased industrial regulation despite claims that it violated the
rights of employers.89 It also justified the labor movement’s use of violence
when regulatory action failed.90
Like many of his contemporaries, Dewey assumed that the march
toward greater efficiency necessarily entailed a march toward greater
81

Id. at 474.
Id. at 469.
83
Id. at 462, 471.
84
Id. at 470, 471.
85
Id. at 470 (“If the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as
deep-seated an organic necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of
deterring him by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid of; he cannot be
improved, or frightened out of his structural reaction.”).
86
See id. at 470–71.
87
See John Dewey, Force and Coercion, 26 INT’L J. OF ETHICS 359 (1916).
88
Id. at 359, 364.
89
Id. at 359.
90
Id. at 362.
82
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justice. He claimed that governmental coercion was becoming less brutal
precisely because it was becoming more efficient.91 Indeed, he argued that
protections for individual rights were nothing more than the byproduct of
the drive toward efficiency:
[T]he question of the limits of individual powers, or liberties, or rights, is finally a
question of the most efficient use of means for ends. That at a certain period liberty
should have been set up as something antecedently sacred per se is natural enough.
Such liberty represented an important factor which had been overlooked. But it is as
92
an efficiency factor that its value must ultimately be assessed.

This argument is strange in several ways. First, Dewey asserts that
respect for individual rights generally promotes efficiency, but makes no
effort to prove this counterintuitive claim.93 Second, Dewey asserts that
respect for individual rights is only justifiable insofar as it promotes
efficiency. In other words, there are no values deeper than efficiency, not
even liberty, dignity, or justice. Third, and strangest of all, Dewey never
tells us what the law is supposed to be efficient at doing. Efficiency is a
measure of the relationship between means and ends. Neither the law nor
anything else can simply be “efficient.” But Dewey has nothing to say
about the proper purposes or ends of the law.
D. INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CRIME

The turn toward instrumentalism represented by the writings of
Holmes and Dewey had three profound implications for the constitutional
law of crime. First, it implied that there are no predetermined ends or
purposes for law, including criminal law. Holmes argued that the purpose
of the law is simply to effectuate the will of the victors; Dewey consciously
avoided any discussion of the purposes of the law. If there are no
predetermined ends for the law, then presumably the legislature can pursue

91

Id. at 364 (“With advance of knowledge, refined, subtle and indirect use of force is
always displacing coarse, obvious and direct methods of applying it.”).
92
Id. at 366.
93
For example, Dewey references a common law maxim that dates back at least to
Edward Coke: the principle that it is unjust for a person to be a judge in his own case. Over
a period of 250 years, common law thinkers had repeatedly used this principle as an example
of a fundamental moral limitation on the power of the government. Dewey accepts the
principle, but tries to restate it in terms of efficiency: “[E]xperience in the past has shown
that it is not usually efficient for parties to be judges in their own cause: that an impartial
judge is an energy saver.” Id. at 362–63. What exactly is this assertion supposed to mean?
Why is an impartial judge “usually” more efficient than a biased one? When is a biased
judge more efficient? Most fundamentally, since efficiency can only be measured in terms
of the end sought to be achieved, what is the end or purpose of judging? Dewey never
answers any of these questions.
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whatever ends it wishes to pursue.94
Second, the turn toward
instrumentalism implied that traditional moral limitations on the means
employed to accomplish the law’s purposes should be discarded. Dewey
was willing to discard individual rights whenever they failed to promote
efficiency.95 Holmes was willing to dispense with rights altogether, at least
where Holmes considered the holders of those rights socially undesirable.96
Third, because instrumentalism denied the existence of any moral limit as
to either the means or the ends of the law, tradition became marginalized as
a source of legal standards. In the wake of the instrumentalist revolution,
courts would look to tradition or precedent to promote the relatively thin
value of uniformity (“deciding like cases alike”) rather than to determine
the substantive reasonableness of a law.
These changes may be seen in two major constitutional criminal cases
from the first half of the twentieth century: United States v. Balint97 and
United States v. Dotterweich.98
In Balint, the defendants were charged with violating the Narcotic Act
of December 17, 1914 by selling a “derivative of opium” and a “derivative
of coca leaves” without obtaining a “written order on a form issued in blank
for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”99 This was a
felony offense involving a maximum sentence of five years
imprisonment.100 The statute did not specify whether mens rea was
required for conviction, and the indictment did not allege that the
defendants knew they were selling narcotics.101 As noted above, the
common law had long required proof of culpability in order to convict a
defendant of a crime. For this reason, courts generally interpreted criminal
statutes to require some proof of mens rea even where the statute did not
explicitly mention it. Thus, the defendants in Balint argued that the statute

94

In this way, instrumentalism represents a turn toward legislative supremacy, a political
principle that is inconsistent with the premises of the American Revolution and the United
States Constitution. See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 1, at 1792–
1810.
95
See Dewey, supra note 87, at 366.
96
See Holmes, supra note 77, at 470 (comparing criminals to rattlesnakes and suggesting
that they be “got rid of”); see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
(upholding law that authorized the involuntary sterilization of “mental defectives”). Holmes
summed up with the now infamous quip, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Id. at
207.
97
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
98
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
99
Balint, 258 U.S. at 251 (citing Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)).
100
See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (noting the five-year maximum punishment
available under the Narcotic Act at issue in Balint).
101
Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
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should be interpreted to require proof of some kind of culpable state of
mind.102 They further argued that it would violate the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause to convict them of a crime without proof of
culpability.103
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments on the ground that the
primary purpose of the Narcotic Act was regulatory rather than penal.
Although the Court acknowledged that mens rea was historically required
for criminal conviction,104 it claimed that “there has been a modification of
this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which
would be obstructed by such a requirement.”105 The Court would not
interpret a criminal statute to require proof of mens rea “where the
emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social
betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes.”106 The Court
dismissed without discussion the idea that the Constitution requires proof of
culpability.107 In short, the Balint Court agreed with Holmes and Dewey
that the legislature should be free to pursue its regulatory goals by whatever
means it considers most efficient, even if those means include criminal
conviction without proof of moral culpability.
Two decades later, in Dotterweich,108 the Supreme Court elevated the
instrumentalism of Balint almost to the level of moral principle.
Dotterweich was the president and general manager of a pharmaceutical
company that purchased drugs from a manufacturer and resold them under
its own name. He was convicted of three misdemeanor violations of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) because the company shipped
misbranded and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce.109 The Supreme
Court emphatically rejected the argument that the statute should be
interpreted to require some knowledge of wrongdoing:
The purposes of this legislation . . . touch phases of the lives and health of people
which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond selfprotection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it
102

See id.
Id. at 252.
104
Id. at 251.
105
Id. at 252.
106
Id.; see also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (“If the offense be a
statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not
charge such knowledge or intent.”).
107
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (asserting that the Narcotic Act “merely uses a criminal
penalty to secure recorded evidence of the disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and
restraining the traffic”).
108
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
109
Id. at 278 (citing Ch. 675, § 301(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1042 (1938) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006))).
103
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is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection
110
of English words.

Because protection of public health is of paramount importance, the Court
implied, the statute should be interpreted as broadly as possible.111 Thus the
Dotterweich Court construed the FDCA to impose not merely strict
liability, but vicarious strict liability. It permitted prosecution not only of
those who unwittingly shipped misbranded goods, but of anyone who stood
in “responsible relation” to such shipments.112 The Court refused to specify
what “responsible relation” meant, on the ground that any attempt to define
it would undermine the flexibility that was necessary to accomplish the
statute’s regulatory goals.113
Taken together, Balint and Dotterweich implied that there is no
fundamental distinction between criminal law and any other sort of
governmental regulation. Of course, if this were true, the legislature would
be free not only to eliminate the mens rea requirement, but also to redefine
crimes as civil causes of action, shift the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defendant, and impose harsh punishments for conduct
involving little or no culpability. In other words, the legislature’s freedom
would conflict with the numerous protections for criminal defendants built
into the Constitution itself.
As we will see below, the entire history of constitutional criminal law
from the 1950s onward constitutes the Supreme Court’s effort to deal with
this conflict in the aftermath of the instrumentalist revolution. In cases
involving the criminal–civil distinction, it has tried to deal with the conflict
by relying on tradition without reference to morality. In cases involving
legislative efforts to manipulate the elements of criminal statutes to
undermine the culpability requirement, it has tried to rely on morality
without reference to tradition. In cases involving proportionality in
punishment, it follows no principled approach whatsoever, deferring blindly
to the legislature in some cases and imposing its own will in others. None
of these approaches has proved workable. Until the Court returns to the

110

Id. at 280.
Id. at 281 (“Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger.”).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 285 (“It would be too treacherous to define or even to indicate by way of
illustration the class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation. To attempt a
formula embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons may responsibly contribute in
furthering a transaction forbidden by an Act of Congress, to wit, to send illicit goods across
state lines, would be mischievous futility.”).
111
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common law synthesis of morality and tradition, the constitutional law of
crime will remain radically incomplete.
III. PUNISHMENT AND THE CRIMINAL–CIVIL DISTINCTION
Crime is one of the central preoccupations of the United States
Constitution, but the term is never defined anywhere in the text. The
Constitution provides protections for those accused of crime114 and it makes
reference to the consequences that may flow from criminal convictions.115

114

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder [or]
ex post facto Law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”); U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V
(“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”).
115
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to declare
the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”); amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.”).
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It defines the substance of one crime (treason),116 gives Congress the power
to punish a second crime (counterfeiting),117 and allows Congress to define
and punish a third set of crimes (piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas and offenses against the law of nations).118 But it does not ever
tell us what a crime is. The reader’s knowledge of the concept appears to
be assumed.
The Supreme Court has not attempted to give a comprehensive
definition of “crime,” but it has engaged in a sustained effort since at least
1798 to draw a constitutional line between civil and criminal statutes.119
The issue typically arises when Congress or a state legislature enacts a
putatively civil statute that deprives individuals of some property or liberty
interest, but does not provide the protections that defendants receive within
the criminal process. In response, the defendant claims that the statute is
really criminal in nature and that he has been deprived of some
constitutional right promised to criminal defendants—for example, the right
to indictment by a grand jury, the right not to be subjected to ex post facto
laws or to double jeopardy, the right against compelled self-incrimination,
etc.120
To resolve this issue, the Court has drawn the following constitutional
line: If the statute’s purpose is to punish the defendant, it is a criminal
statute and the defendant must be accorded the protections of the criminal
116

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort.”).
117
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 6 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide
for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States . . . .”).
118
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law
of Nations . . . .”).
119
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution only applies to laws that impose a criminal punishment).
120
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89–92 (2003) (holding that a law requiring sex
offender registration and publication of identifying information does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (holding that a law
authorizing civil commitment of “sexually violent predators” does not violate the Ex Post
Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–72 (1996)
(holding that a law permitting forfeiture of property allegedly used to manufacture marijuana
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741–
45 (1987) (holding that a law permitting pretrial detention based on a finding of future
dangerousness does not violate due process by permitting punishment before trial); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 146 (1963) (holding that a statute imposing loss of
citizenship on those who leave or stay out of the country to avoid military service violated
the Constitution by failing to provide the procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
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process.121 If the purpose of the statute is not punitive, the Court accepts
the “civil” label and denies the defendant these protections.
If a statute’s purpose is punitive, it is criminal. This is all well and
good, but it does not get us very far. We still must ask what “punitive
purpose” means. More specifically, what is it about a punitive purpose that
differentiates it from a non-punitive purpose and calls for the heightened
protections of the criminal justice system?
The Supreme Court’s criminal–civil cases make clear that a punitive
purpose is not merely a purpose to deprive an individual of liberty or
property. As early as 1798 the Court held that a statute depriving a person
of property rights was not a criminal statute (and thus not subject to the Ex
Post Facto Clause) unless the deprivation was imposed for the purpose of
punishment.122 More recently, the Court held that a statute that authorized
the total, permanent deprivation of a person’s liberty was not criminal, and
thus not subject to the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, because
the deprivation of liberty was not imposed for the purpose of punishment.123
As these cases indicate, the key issue is not the nature of the
deprivation but the reason for it. A statute is only criminal if it evinces a
purpose to punish. But what is a purpose to punish? In its early criminal–
civil distinction cases, the Supreme Court seemed to assume that everyone
knew what the purpose of punishment was, and it focused instead on
evidence that the legislature had such a purpose. In some cases, the Court
focused on whether the form of the sanction was inherently punitive,124 and
121
See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. at 390, 396–97, 399 (defining criminal laws as laws that
“punish” the defendant for prior conduct); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49
(1980) (“[W]here Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have
inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate that intention.”). Civil statutes that authorize imposition of punitive damages are
arguably the biggest exception to the rule that a punitive purpose triggers the protections of
the criminal process. The Supreme Court has distinguished such statutes from criminal
statutes on the ground that the government is typically neither a party to cases seeking
punitive damages nor a recipient of the damages award. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989).
122
See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
123
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351, 371 (1997) (holding that a statute calling
for long-term commitment of “sexually violent predators” was not punitive).
124
See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that
Congress lacks the power to authorize a non-judicial tribunal to sentence aliens to sixty days
at hard labor: “[W]hen congress sees fit to . . . [subject] the persons of such aliens to
infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, we think such
legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the
accused.”); cf. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) (“[I]mprisonment in a
state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an infamous punishment.”); Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428–29 (1885) (holding that a fifteen-year term of
imprisonment amounted to an “infamous punishment” giving rise to the Fifth Amendment
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in others it focused on whether the sanction truly furthered the non-punitive
purpose it purported to serve.125 This approach was satisfactory because
there was no apparent disagreement as to what a punitive purpose was.
The assumption that the phrase “punitive purpose” enjoyed a shared
cultural meaning was called into question by the instrumentalist revolution.
Instrumentalists denied that the terms “crime” and “punishment” had any
particular meaning that distinguished them from other legal categories.
“Crime” was merely a term that could be applied to any social problem and
“punishment” was merely a means for resolving any social problem. Thus,
as shown above, Holmes argued that the true purpose of the criminal law
was to neutralize the danger posed by criminals (either through
extermination or deterrence), not to punish them on the basis of their moral
culpability. Similarly, the Balint and Dotterweich Courts authorized
legislatures to create regulatory crimes whose purpose was to prevent some
social harm rather than impose punishment.126 Following this line of
reasoning, many argued that crime and punishment—like all other social
problems—should be analyzed in purely utilitarian terms.127
This approach to criminal law posed an obvious problem for
constitutional interpretation. If there is no inherent difference between
requirement of indictment by a grand jury: “[A] sentence to the state prison, for any term of
time, must be considered [an infamous punishment]. The convict is placed in a public place
of punishment, common to the whole state, subject to solitary imprisonment, to have his hair
cropped, to be clothed in conspicuous prison dress, subjected to hard labor without pay, to
hard fare, coarse and meager food, and to severe discipline. Some of these a convict in the
house of correction is subject to; but the house of correction . . . had not the same character
of infamy attached to it. Besides, the state prison, for any term of time, is now by law
substituted for all the ignominious punishments formerly in use.”) (citations omitted).
125
See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 320 (1866) (holding that a provision of
the Missouri constitution forbidding clergy to preach unless they take an oath declaring that
they have “never, by act or word, manifested [their] adherence to the Confederate side in the
Civil War” was an ex post facto criminal law and a bill of attainder because “it was exacted,
not from any notion that the several acts designated indicated unfitness for the callings, but
because it was thought that the several acts deserved punishment, and that for many of them
there was no way to inflict punishment except by depriving the parties, who had committed
them, of some of the rights and privileges of the citizen”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333
(1866) (holding that a federal statute requiring attorneys who wished to practice in federal
court to take an oath that they had never supported Confederacy was an ex post facto
criminal law and a bill of attainder).
126
If a criminal statute is defined as a statute that imposes sanctions for a punitive
purpose, then a regulatory crime would be defined as a statute whose punitive purpose is
non-punitive. Neither the Balint nor the Dotterweich Court makes any effort to resolve the
self-contradictory, nonsensical nature of this definition, nor has the contradiction been
definitively resolved in the decades that have passed since these decisions.
127
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:
A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (2003).

2012]

PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY

677

punitive and non-punitive purposes, there is no principled way to
distinguish between civil and criminal laws. Followed to its logical
conclusion, instrumentalism would permit the legislature to circumvent all
of the protections the Constitution gives criminal defendants by simply
relabeling a criminal statute as civil. For this reason, it was imperative that
the Supreme Court provide a clear definition of “punitive purpose” that
would serve to distinguish civil from criminal statutes.
In the wake of the instrumentalist revolution, however, the Supreme
Court had no desire to provide such clarification, needed or not.128 Instead,
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,129 the Court provided a confoundingly
opaque test for determining whether a statute has a punitive purpose: (1)
whether the sanction authorized by the statute imposes “an affirmative
disability or restraint”; (2) whether the sanction “has historically been
regarded as a punishment”; (3) whether the sanction “comes into play only
on a finding of scienter”; (4) whether the sanction “promote[s] the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”; (5) whether
the sanction applies to behavior that is “already a crime”; (6) whether the
sanction is “rationally connected” to a possible “alternative purpose”; and
(7) whether the sanction “appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose.”130

128
A number of scholars have noted how the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clear
method for distinguishing between criminal and civil statutes has led to confusion as to
where the line actually falls. See, e.g., Jonathan Charney, The Need for Constitutional
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 481 (1974)
(“[T]he trend at the federal level is toward changing many criminal sanctions to civil
penalties.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1875 (1992)
(describing the “encroachment of the criminal law into areas previously thought to be civil or
‘regulatory’ in character”); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the
Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2005) (“It is no exaggeration to rank the
distinction among the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory.”); Gail
Heriot, An Essay on the Civil–Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive
Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 43, 45 (1996) (“From civil penalties to punitive
damages, civil forfeiture to criminal restitution, legal devices that are arguably criminal–civil
hybrids seem to be more common than they were a century ago.”); Paul H. Robinson. The
Criminal–Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 210 (1996) (“Civil
law has taken on some characteristics of criminal law, such as its increased use of punitive
damages, but more commonly criminal law has been expanded to include what were
traditionally civil violations.”); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment
Theory and the Criminal–Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 796–97 (1997) (noting
that “the overlap between modern modes of criminal punishment and civil regulation has
made it harder to distinguish between the two”).
129
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
130
Id. at 168–69.
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To call this multifactor test confusing and amorphous is an
understatement. The Court never tells us how these factors relate to each
other, nor how they are supposed to tell us whether a statute has a punitive
purpose. More fundamentally, the Court never tells us what a punitive
purpose is. One of the factors (number four) asks whether the statute
furthers the goals of retribution or deterrence. Does this mean that a
punitive purpose is the same thing as a retributive or deterrent purpose? If
so, why is this merely one of seven factors in the Court’s analysis? Can the
fact that a statute furthers other purposes often associated with punishment,
such as rehabilitation or incapacitation, demonstrate that the statute has a
punitive purpose? If so, why are these purposes omitted from the test? If
not, why not? The list of questions goes on and on, and the answers are
quite unclear.
The remaining factors in the Mendoza-Martinez test do not shed much
additional light on the definition of punitive purpose. Some factors focus
on the sanction’s effect (factor one) or its historical status (factor two).
Others focus on the defendant’s conduct (factor five) and state of mind
(factor three). Still others focus on the relationship between the sanction’s
effect and the purposes it seems to serve (factors six and seven).
The Supreme Court’s efforts in Mendoza-Martinez only start to make
sense when one realizes that the Court’s goal was to specify a method for
determining whether a statute has a “punitive purpose” without defining the
term “punitive.” The Court apparently hoped that by following this
approach it could continue to draw a line between criminal and civil statutes
without having to choose between traditional and instrumentalist ideas
about crime. Thus the Mendoza-Martinez test focused solely on the results
of prior civil–criminal distinction cases, not the moral reasoning that
animated them. This is why the factors listed in the Mendoza-Martinez test
appear so random.
When one examines the moral basis for the cases underlying the
Mendoza-Martinez factors, it becomes clear that they represent the two
conflicting approaches to the definition of “punitive purpose” discussed
above. The pre-Balint cases focus on facts tending to show that the
challenged statute had a retributive purpose. For example, a statute that
allows conviction only where the defendant has a culpable state of mind
(factor 3)131 or that imposes an “infamous” sanction like imprisonment
(factor 2)132 is punitive because it imposes sanctions as an expression of
131
See id. at 168 n.24 (citing prior criminal–civil distinction cases that focused on the
presence or absence of a “scienter” requirement).
132
See id. at 168 n.23 (citing prior criminal–civil distinction cases that focused on
whether the sanction authorized by the statute had traditionally been considered
punishment).
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societal blame. Some of the post-Balint cases, however, imply that a
punitive purpose could be either retributive or deterrent in nature (factor
4)133 because punishment is just another form of regulation. The MendozaMartinez Court papered over the incompatibility of these two lines of
precedent by focusing solely on the holdings and by ignoring the reasoning
underlying them. This approach allowed the Court to ask whether the
challenged statute looked or operated like other statutes that have been
found to have a punitive purpose, without ever asking the foundational
question of what a punitive purpose is. But if we do not know that, we do
not really know anything. Put differently, what is the point of relying on
the holdings of prior cases without either acknowledging the conflicting
rationales for those holdings or trying to reconcile such conflicts?
Adding to the inadequacy of the Mendoza-Martinez test, the Supreme
Court has made judicial policing of the line between criminal and civil
statutes more difficult by building a wall of deference around the legislative
decision to call a statute civil rather than criminal. In Flemming v. Nestor,
the Court announced that if the legislature labels a statute civil, “only the
clearest proof” of a punitive purpose would lead the Court to conclude that
it was actually criminal in nature.134 Of course, if we do not have a clear
idea of what a punitive purpose is, it will be exceedingly difficult to provide
the “clearest proof” that a given statute exhibits such a purpose. Flemming
furthered the instrumentalist goal of giving the legislature freedom to
choose both the means and the ends of the criminal law by making it much
harder for the judiciary to reject the label (civil or criminal) that the
legislature gives a statute. But it did so by making the criminal–civil
distinction exponentially more difficult to enforce.
But all is not lost. Although the Supreme Court has avoided defining
what a punitive purpose is, in recent years it has been less reluctant to say
what a punitive purpose is not. By engaging in a little reverse engineering,
we can obtain a surprisingly clear picture of what the Supreme Court now
means by “punitive.” As two relatively recent cases illustrate, when the
Supreme Court says that a statute’s purpose is punitive, it really means
retributive. Despite the obfuscation of Mendoza-Martinez and Flemming, it
is becoming increasingly clear that neither a purpose to deter, incapacitate,
nor to rehabilitate135 can transform a putatively civil statute into a criminal
one. Only a retributive purpose can.
133

See id. at 168 n.25 (citing post-instrumentalist criminal–civil distinction cases that
focused on the presence of both retributive and deterrent purposes).
134
363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
135
The Supreme Court has not directly considered the claim that a purpose to rehabilitate
can transform a putatively civil statute into a criminal one. But in the context of civil
commitment statutes, the Court held that a purpose to provide “treatment” for sexually
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The first case, Kansas v. Hendricks, involved a man who was civilly
committed under Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) after
completing a ten-year prison sentence for taking indecent liberties with two
thirteen-year-old boys.136
The SVPA provided for indefinite civil
commitment of “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.”137 Because Hendricks was diagnosed as
a pedophile and had a long history of child molestation, he was committed
under the SVPA shortly after it was enacted.138 Hendricks argued that the
commitment procedure under the SVPA was actually criminal in nature
because its purpose was to incapacitate him rather than treat him. 139
Because it was really a criminal statute, its application to him violated the
Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws140 and double jeopardy.141
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the SVPA
was not punitive because it did not further the goals of retribution or
deterrence. The SVPA was not retributive because its purpose was to
protect society, not to impose blame: “The Act’s purpose is not retributive
because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. Instead,
such conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate
that a ‘mental abnormality’ exists or to support a finding of future
dangerousness.”142 This conclusion was supported by the fact that the
SVPA did not require either a prior conviction or a showing of “scienter” to
support commitment. The question of the defendant’s blameworthiness did
not matter; all that mattered was his dangerousness.143 The Court also
dangerous persons designed to render them safe to reenter society was an indication that the
statute was non-punitive. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (“[T]he State has
disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the treatment of those it commits, and
established a system under which committed persons may be released after the briefest time
in confinement.”). Such “treatment” is indistinguishable from rehabilitation.
136
521 U.S. 346, 350–54 (1997).
137
Id. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)).
138
Id. at 353–56.
139
Id. at 365.
140
Id. at 350–53, 360–61.
141
Id. at 360–61.
142
Id. at 362.
143
Id. The Hendricks Court’s conclusion that the SVPA did not demonstrate a
retributive statutory purpose is highly questionable, at best. As Wayne Logan has pointed
out, the SVPA was enacted in response to a public outcry arising from a gruesome rape and
murder. It was part of a comprehensive package of sentencing changes that increased the
severity of penalties for future sex offenses in tandem with the provision allowing for
involuntary commitment of prior sex offenders. The legislative history included numerous
expressions of punitive intent, and the very title of the statute labeled those subjected to civil

2012]

PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY

681

concluded that the SVPA did not further the goal of deterrence, because it
covered a class of people who were largely undeterrable.144
The Hendricks Court denied that incapacitation is an inherently
punitive goal. Hendricks argued that the SVPA was different from other
civil commitment statutes that had been upheld as non-penal because it did
not require the state to attempt to cure him so that he could be released. 145
Rather, the premise of the SVPA was that there is no known cure for sex
offenders with certain kinds of “mental abnormalit[ies],” and that the only
thing that could be done with them was to segregate them from society.146
Hendricks argued that because the primary purpose of this statute was
incapacitation, civil commitment amounted to a kind of “disguised
punishment.”147 The Court rejected this argument, stating that “under the
appropriate circumstances and when accompanied by proper procedures,
incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil law.”148
The second case, Smith v. Doe,149 involved a challenge to the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA).150 The ASORA required
commitment as “predators.” See Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1312–16 (1998).
144
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362–63 (“Those persons committed under the Act are, by
definition, suffering from a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder’ that prevents
them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are therefore
unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”).
145
Id. at 365.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 365–66. The fact that a purpose to incapacitate is different from a purpose to
punish does not mean that the Constitution is unconcerned with involuntary civil
commitment statutes. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
forbid the deprivation of liberty without “due process of law.” Statutes that permit a
complete deprivation of liberty based on a finding of future dangerousness are in tension
with the basic premise of a free society, which is that individuals have the capacity for free
choice, including the choice whether or not to commit crimes in the future. Many of the
same factors that are used to predict “future dangerousness” of sex offenders could also be
used to justify the commitment of whole classes of people with personality characteristics
indicative of likely future criminal activity. For example, the State could incarcerate persons
based on impulsiveness, short-term orientation, or antisocial attitudes and associations, on
the ground that it will prevent them from committing future crimes. The Supreme Court
tried to mitigate this risk a few years after Hendricks was decided by holding that it denies
due process to civilly commit a person based on future dangerousness unless “the psychiatric
diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, [is] sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects
him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case.” Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). It is unclear how protective the
Court’s creation of a quasi-medical, quasi-legal category of non-insane persons who may be
subjected to involuntary civil commitment will turn out to be.
149
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
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convicted sex offenders who lived within the state to provide a variety of
personal information to law enforcement.151 Much of this information,
including the offender’s name, address, photograph, and crime (or crimes)
of conviction, was then made publicly available via the internet.152 Doe
argued that the ASORA was an ex post facto criminal law because it
imposed a sanction—the registration requirement and the resulting public
exposure to stigma—for conduct Doe committed prior to the ASORA’s
enactment. As in Hendricks, the Court rejected this argument, holding that
the purpose of the law was the protection of public safety, not the
imposition of punishment. The ASORA lacked a retributive purpose
because the registration requirement was designed to give parents
information that would help them keep their children safe, not to cast blame
on the registrant.153 Although the publication of Doe’s information on the
internet would have a shaming effect, this was merely an incidental effect
of the law, not its purpose.154
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that the ASORA served a
deterrent purpose. By requiring sex offenders to register with the state and
by publishing their identifying information, the Act was intended to deter
those offenders and others from committing sex crimes. But the Court held
that the existence of a deterrent purpose is not sufficient to transform a civil
regulatory law into a criminal law: “To hold that the mere presence of a
deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ . . . would severely
undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation.”155
Once we understand that a purpose to deter, incapacitate, or
rehabilitate will not serve to distinguish between a criminal and a civil
150

1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010
(2010)).
151
Doe, 538 U.S. at 90.
152
Id. at 91.
153
Id. at 102.
154
Id. at 97–99. As with the Sexually Violent Predator Act in Hendricks, the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the ASORA did not have a retributive purpose is open to question.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, the registration requirement was triggered by a
prior conviction for an aggravated sex offense, implying that the ASORA was focused more
on past misconduct than future dangerousness. Id. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Act
imposed “onerous and intrusive obligations on convicted sex offenders” and subjected them
“to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism.” Id. at 115. Finally, it closely
resembled both traditional “shaming” punishments and modern punishments such as
supervised release or parole. Id. at 115–16.
155
Id. at 102 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105 (noting that “deterrence ‘may
serve civil as well as criminal goals’” (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292
(1996))); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (“[F]orfeiture . . . serves a deterrent
purpose distinct from any punitive purpose.”).
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statute, the substantive constitutional meaning of “crime” comes into focus.
A statute is criminal if it exhibits a retributive purpose, that is, if it
authorizes the state to impose sanctions to express the community’s blame
or condemnation for the commission of an unlawful act. Although other
purposes, such as deterrence or incapacitation, are often associated with
punishment, these purposes are also compatible with civil regulatory
statutes and so cannot serve to distinguish criminal from civil laws.
The centrality of retributive purpose in distinguishing criminal from
civil laws reflects an obvious but often-overlooked fact: A defendant who
is subjected to criminal punishment loses more than property or even
liberty: he also loses his good name. He is labeled by the community as a
person worthy of blame, stigma, and retribution. He is labeled a criminal.
This is a very serious thing indeed, and it calls for the protections the
Constitution affords criminal defendants.156
This brings us back to the culpability requirement discussed above.
The Supreme Court’s recent criminal–civil distinction cases implicitly
recognize the major premise underlying this requirement: that criminal
punishment is the community’s expression of moral condemnation or blame
through the imposition of sanctions. These cases say almost nothing about
the moral principle that flows from this premise: that punishment may not
justly be imposed without culpability. The high wall of deference imposed
by Flemming v. Nestor still stands, and judges still have little capacity to
prevent the legislature from imposing punishment under the pretextual label
of civil liability. We are back on the right road, but we have not moved
very far from our post-instrumentalist starting point.
We will not see the Supreme Court straightforwardly assert that the
law should inflict punishment only on those who are blameworthy until we
have followed the Court’s long but irresolute quest to define limits on the
legislature’s power to create crimes lacking traditional elements associated
with blameworthiness, such as mens rea and actus reus. We will go there
next.
156
Donald Dripps has argued that the imposition of blame is the key factor
distinguishing criminal from civil statutes because of the special “political temptations” the
blame-casting function of criminal law creates for oppressive governments. Criminal
punishment involves “severe sanctions . . . accompanied . . . by the self-congratulatory
emotion of blame. The convict is held up for hatred as well as confined; the government
inflicts pain with a self-conscious attitude of moral superiority.” Donald Dripps, The
Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory Model” of, or “Pathological
Perspective” on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 204
(1996). This combination of sanctions and blame-casting makes the criminal law an
attractive tool for the suppression of political opponents. The risk that government will use
the criminal law for this purpose is, according to Dripps, a central reason the Constitution
provides special protections for criminal defendants. See id. at 202.
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IV. PUNISHMENT WITHOUT BORDERS—THE CREATION OF STRICT
LIABILITY CRIMES
One of the first things law students learn in their introductory Criminal
Law course is the principle Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea157: The
act does not make one guilty unless the mind is also guilty.158 As noted
above, this principle has been so fundamental to the criminal law that courts
and commentators treated it as axiomatic for more than 500 years.159
One of the next things law students learn is that this principle is
axiomatic no more. Since the middle of the nineteenth century legislatures
have created strict liability crimes that punish even those who do not have a
guilty mind. Since the first part of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court has explicitly endorsed the constitutionality of such laws. In today’s
world, the act may make one guilty even though the mind is innocent.
But even this is not entirely correct. As we will see below, even at the
height of the instrumentalist revolution, the Supreme Court expressed its
belief that it is unjust to impose punishment in the absence of culpability. It
has sometimes attempted to enforce this principle directly as a matter of
constitutional law, but has retreated in the face of the disruption such
enforcement threatened to cause. It now enforces the culpability principle
through statutory interpretation and limited constitutional intervention, but
this enforcement is incomplete and haphazard.
A. STRICT LIABILITY, INSTRUMENTALISM, AND THE CULPABILITY
PRINCIPLE

Strict liability offenses punish the defendant’s conduct without
requiring proof of any culpable state of mind relating to such conduct.160
157

3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 36, ch. 1, at 961.
Although mens rea was traditionally required in all criminal prosecutions, the
definitions of the state of mind required to establish mens rea could be highly varied and
confusing. One of the main purposes of the Model Penal Code was to simplify and clarify
the meaning of mens rea. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea
Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569.
159
See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
160
Although commentators have given a variety of definitions of “strict liability”
offenses, some of which are more inclusive than mine, they generally agree that the term
“strict liability” encompasses at least those statutes that punish conduct without requiring
any kind of guilty mind. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 145
(5th ed. 2009) (strict liability crimes are those that “do not contain a mens rea requirement
regarding one or more elements of the actus reus”); Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of
Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses—A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28
UCLA L. REV. 463, 463 n.3 (1981) (describing strict liability as “liability without
culpability”); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987)
(“Strict liability imposes guilt without regard to whether the defendant knew or could
158
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This category of crime first arose as part of the regulatory state’s response
to the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution, and its legitimacy was
bolstered by the arguments of instrumentalists such as Holmes and
Dewey.161 As Francis Sayre wrote in his seminal article on the topic, these
new offenses reflected a conceptual shift in the criminal law from the
determination of “individual guilt” to the prevention of “social danger.”162
This shift toward using criminal punishment as a method of social
control presented a potential constitutional problem. As discussed above,
the various constitutional provisions relating to criminal law suggest that
“crime” has a substantive constitutional meaning. A criminal statute is a
statute that uses sanctions to express the community’s blame or
condemnation for the commission of an unlawful act. Strict liability
statutes create the risk that such blame could be directed at morally innocent
people—people who perform the forbidden act but do so reasonably, in
good faith, and without knowledge of the facts that make the act wrongful
or illegal.
Of course, this is only a problem if the idea of culpability—like the
ideas of “crime” and “punishment” in the criminal–civil distinction cases—
has some substantive constitutional meaning. A positivist would argue that
culpability does not have such meaning. Culpability is whatever the
legislature says it is.163 If the legislature enacts a statute that requires a
showing of mens rea to establish culpability, mens rea is required. If it
enacts a statute that does not require mens rea to establish culpability, mens
rea is not required. One is culpable for violating a criminal statute, not for
doing so with some constitutionally predetermined state of mind.

reasonably have known some relevant feature of the situation.”); Alan C. Michaels,
Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999) (“[S]trict liability crimes
contain a material element for which the actor’s culpability is irrelevant.”); Richard G.
Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30
B.C. L. REV. 337, 364 n.114 (1989) (defining a strict liability offense as one in which the
mental state of any actor is irrelevant).
161
See supra Part II.C.
162
Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1933).
163
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (9th ed. 2009) (defining positivism as “[t]he
theory that legal rules are valid only because they are enacted by an existing political
authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are grounded in
morality or in natural law”); see also Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an
Offense, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2000) (“We might also say . . . that a legal doctrine or
concept is ‘positivistic’ if it derives its content entirely from legislative pronouncement. It is
substantive, or nonpositivistic, if it derives its content at least in part from deeper and more
fundamental principles. Where the notion of an offense is concerned, the nonpositivistic
alternative is to treat the substantive provisions of the criminal law as resting on a set of
constitutional values.”).
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The Supreme Court’s early strict liability cases adopted an
unabashedly instrumentalist and positivist perspective. As discussed in Part
II.D above, the Supreme Court announced in the Balint and Dotterweich
cases that the legislature was free to use the criminal law for regulatory
rather than punitive purposes and that there was no requirement that
criminal statutes be interpreted to require proof of moral culpability.
But lying just beneath the surface in both cases are suppressed themes
of punishment and innocence. The Balint and Dotterweich courts both
acknowledged that strict liability statutes authorized conviction of the
“innocent.”164 Both courts also recognized that it is unjust to punish the
innocent.165
Finally, each court carefully avoided mentioning the
punishment that would flow from its affirmance of the defendants’
convictions.
Violation of the Narcotic Act was a felony that subjected Balint to up
to five years in prison, yet the Balint court never mentioned either the word
“felony” or the maximum punishment available under the statute.166
Similarly, Dotterweich’s three misdemeanor convictions meant that he
could be sentenced to up to three years in prison and would spend the rest
of his life with a criminal record.167 But the Dotterweich Court took no note
of Dotterweich’s potential sentence. In order to uphold strict liability
criminal statutes as a permissible form of regulation, the Balint and
Dotterweich Courts avoided acknowledging that the punishments they
imposed were every bit as real as those imposed by traditional criminal
statutes.
The culpability principle remained just below the surface in Balint and
Dotterweich because the Court firmly held it there.

164
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (acknowledging that the
statute authorized punishment of those who were “otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger”); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922)
(noting that the statute authorized punishment of “an innocent seller”).
165
See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (describing punishment of the morally innocent as an
“injustice”); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 (using the more euphemistic term “hardship”).
Dotterweich went further than Balint in expressing the Court’s hope that discretionary actors
within the criminal justice system would avoid using strict liability statutes to punish the
morally innocent: “In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial
judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted. Our system of criminal justice
necessarily depends on ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers . . . .’” Id. at
285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)). By asserting that
prosecutors, judges, and juries would demonstrate “good sense,” “wise guidance,”
“judgment,” “conscience,” and “circumspection” in declining to punish the morally
innocent, the Court strongly implied that such punishment was both immoral and unwise.
166
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (noting the facts of Balint).
167
See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (1940).
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B. THE TURN AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY

The Dotterweich Court’s faith that prosecutors would not use strict
liability statutes to prosecute morally innocent people turned out to be illfounded. In the decade between 1952 and 1962, the Supreme Court
considered four cases in which prosecutors used strict liability criminal
statutes to prosecute individuals the Court considered morally innocent. In
Morissette v. United States,168 the federal government prosecuted a man for
theft without proving that he intended to steal and despite strong evidence
that he had a reasonable good faith belief that the property had been
abandoned. In Lambert v. California,169 the state prosecuted a woman for
failing to comply with a registration requirement of which she neither knew
nor had any reason to know. In Smith v. California,170 the state prosecuted
a bookseller for possessing an obscene book even though he did not know
the book’s contents. Finally, in Robinson v. California,171 the state
prosecuted a person for being addicted to narcotics without proving whether
the addiction was acquired voluntarily or involuntarily and without proving
any voluntary act of narcotics ingestion.
As will be shown immediately below, in each of these cases the Court
thwarted the prosecution because it believed it was unjust to impose
punishment without proof of moral culpability. But because the Court had
previously rejected the culpability requirement in Balint and Dotterweich, it
struggled to find a legal basis for its decision to invalidate these
convictions. In Morissette, Lambert, and Smith the Court held that a
conviction could not be sustained without proof of mens rea, but it
grounded this holding on a different legal rationale in each case (first
statutory construction, then the act–omission distinction, then emanations
from the First Amendment). Finally, in Robinson, the Court overtly broke
with instrumentalism, holding that it was cruel and unusual to impose
punishment without proof of culpability. But the decision in Robinson was
not grounded on the lack of a mens rea requirement. Rather, it was based
on the Court’s belief that narcotics addicts are not responsible moral
agents—despite the fact that Robinson’s addiction did not meet the
traditional definition of legal insanity. In other words, although Robinson
rejected instrumentalism’s rejection of morality, it retained
instrumentalism’s rejection of tradition as a source of moral and legal
standards. As we will see below, this rejection of tradition in favor of

168
169
170
171

342 U.S. 246 (1952).
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
361 U.S. 147 (1959).
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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scientism made Robinson’s effort to revive the culpability principle too
disruptive for the Supreme Court to maintain.
1. Morissette and Statutory Construction
The first case, Morissette v. United States,172 involved a defendant who
went onto a practice bombing range owned by the federal government,
collected a number of spent bomb casings, and made $84 selling them for
scrap.173 The casings had been “dumped in heaps” on the bombing range,
and had been allowed to sit rusting for up to four years.174 Morissette
removed the casings in broad daylight and in plain view of those passing
by, making no effort to hide what he was doing.175 When the government
investigated the disappearance of the casings, Morissette admitted taking
them but told the investigators he thought they had been abandoned.176 He
was ultimately charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 641, which made it a
crime to “embezzle[], steal[], purloin[], or knowingly convert[]”
government property.177 At trial, Morissette tried to argue that he should be
acquitted because his belief that the casings were abandoned negated any
intent to steal, but the court refused to let him do so.178 The Court of
Appeals upheld this ruling on the ground that “knowing conversion” was a
strict liability crime. Because Congress did not specifically state that intent
to steal was an element of the offense, the court felt bound by Balint to
construe the statute as imposing strict liability.179
The Supreme Court reversed Morissette’s conviction and appeared to
be shocked by the government’s effort to prosecute him for theft under
circumstances strongly suggesting that he was innocent of any intent to
steal. Unlike the Balint and Dotterweich Courts, the Morissette Court
focused on the fact that a criminal conviction would cause the defendant to
suffer real punishment. The Court noted that Morissette was not only
sentenced to two months imprisonment or a $200 fine,180 but was

172

342 U.S. 246.
Id. at 247.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 248.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 248–49.
179
Id. at 250 (“The court ruled that this particular offense requires no element of criminal
intent. This conclusion was thought to be required by the failure of Congress to express such
a requisite and this Court’s decisions in United States v. Behrman and United States v.
Balint.” (citations omitted)).
180
Id. at 248.
173
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“brand[ed] . . . as a thief.”181 Such branding would impose significant
stigma on Morissette because theft crimes are “invasions of rights of
property which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and
arouse public demand for retribution.”182 Had the bomb casings Morissette
took been worth just a little more money, the crime would have had “the
infamy . . . of a felony, which, says Maitland, is . . . ‘as bad a word as you
can give to man or thing.’”183
The imposition of punishment in the absence of culpability was, the
Morissette Court said, “inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal
law.”184 In language that had strong constitutional overtones, the Court
asserted:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental
element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s
185
familiar exculpatory “But I didn’t mean to.”

Two core ideas underlie this passage. The first is the culpability principle:
Because punishment is the community’s formal expression of blame or
condemnation through the imposition of sanctions, it is unjust to impose
punishment in the absence of culpability. The second idea flows from the
first: A person is only culpable if he has a blameworthy state of mind.
These ideas are “universal and persistent” in mature legal systems,
Morissette asserted, and are so closely tied to our natural intuitions that they
come spontaneously even to a small child.
The Morissette Court also pointed out that strict liability crimes tend to
undermine many of the criminal procedural protections contained within the
Constitution. By eliminating the mens rea requirement, such crimes move
culpability questions from jurors to prosecutors, undermining the right to a
jury trial.186 More generally, such crimes “strip” the morally innocent
defendant of the legal protections he would have received at common law, a
181

Id. at 276.
Id. at 260.
183
Id. (citations omitted). The statute under which Morissette was charged, 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1994), treated thefts of property worth less than $100 as misdemeanors and thefts of
property worth more than $100 as felonies. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248 n.2. The bomb
casings Morissette took were worth $84. Id. at 247.
184
Id. at 250.
185
Id. at 250–51 (footnote omitted).
186
See id. at 274 (“It is alike the general rule of law and the dictate of natural justice that
to constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention. Under our
system (unless in exceptional cases), both must be found by the jury to justify a conviction
for crime.” (quoting People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334 (1891))).
182

690

JOHN F. STINNEFORD

[Vol. 102

move that constitutes “a manifest impairment of the immunities of the
individual.”187
And yet Morissette did not overturn the Court’s prior decisions
upholding strict liability crimes.188 Rather, it framed its discussion of mens
rea as a question of statutory construction rather than constitutional law.189
The Morissette Court did try to soften the instrumentalism of Balint
and Dotterweich by characterizing them as involving “public welfare”
offenses.190 The Court noted that public welfare statutes imposed duties on
members of a regulated industry who could reasonably be expected to know
of these duties and comply with them.191 Under such circumstances, failure
to comply with a statutory duty involved culpability akin to negligence.192
Moreover, the punishment such statutes imposed was light and involved
little or no stigma.193 Because public welfare offenses covered only those
people who could reasonably be expected to know and comply with their
statutory duties, and because such statutes imposed only light punishments,
the Morissette Court did not call their constitutionality into question. But it
left open the question of whether a strict liability criminal statute that was
not restricted to unreasonable conduct or that imposed significant
punishment or stigma was constitutional.
The Supreme Court considered this question in a series of cases
decided in the late 1950s and early 1960s: Lambert v. California,194 Smith v.
California,195 and Robinson v. California.196 Because these were state
187

Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
Id. at 260.
189
See id. at 250 (“If [the strict liability cases] be deemed precedents for principles of
construction generally applicable to federal penal statutes, they authorize this conviction. . . .
We think . . . that an effect has been ascribed to them more comprehensive than was
contemplated.”).
190
Id. at 255.
191
Id. at 256 (“The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to
prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than
it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.”).
192
Cf. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262 (1996)
(“A defendant’s culpability is . . . thought to consist either of a mental state that has a
prohibited harm as its object . . . , or of the fact that the defendant had available to him
evidence from which he should have formed a mental state concerning a prohibited harm
(i.e., negligence).”).
193
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (“[P]enalties [for public welfare offenses] commonly are
relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”). This
assertion seems at odds with the fact that the statute at issue in Balint branded the accused as
a felon and subjected him to up to five years in prison. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
194
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
195
361 U.S. 147 (1959).
196
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
188
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rather than federal cases, the Supreme Court could not use statutory
construction to vindicate the culpability principle, for it had to accept the
construction given the statute by the state courts. It could only invalidate
these prosecutions through constitutional interpretation. In each case, the
Court found that a statute authorizing punishment without culpability was
unconstitutional, but in each case the Court employed a different rationale
for its decision.
2. Lambert and the Act–Omission Distinction
In Lambert, the defendant was convicted of violating a statute that
required all convicted felons who remain in Los Angeles for more than five
days to register with the authorities.197 Lambert had lived in Los Angeles
for seven years, during which time she had been convicted of forgery, a
felony. She never registered with authorities, but continued living in Los
Angeles after her conviction.198 There was no evidence that Lambert knew
or had reason to know of the registration requirement.199 Because the
registration statute imposed strict liability, however, she was convicted.200
The Supreme Court held that Lambert’s conviction violated her right
to due process, but had real difficulty in stating why it reached this
conclusion. The Court focused primarily on Lambert’s lack of notice201:
Lambert neither knew nor had reason to know of the registration
requirement,202 and therefore her failure to register was morally innocent.
Her conviction certainly violated the culpability principle. But in Balint
and Dotterweich the Court had affirmed the power of the legislature to
authorize punishment of the morally innocent, and the Lambert Court was
not interested in overturning those precedents.203
Ultimately, it
distinguished those cases on the ground that Lambert’s conduct was
“wholly passive—mere failure to register,” whereas the other strict liability
cases involved affirmative acts.204 Lambert thus appears to stand for the
proposition that when a statute criminalizes an omission, prosecutors are
constitutionally required to prove “actual knowledge of the duty [to act] or
proof of the probability of such knowledge.”205 But when the statute
197

355 U.S. at 226.
Id.
199
In fact, the Court assumed that Lambert had no actual knowledge of the registration
requirement. Id. at 227.
200
Id. at 225, 227.
201
Id. at 228.
202
Id. at 227.
203
See id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 229.
198
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criminalizes an affirmative act, it would appear that no such proof is
required. As Justice Frankfurter (the author of Dotterweich) pointed out in
dissent, it is hard to discern why there should be a moral or constitutional
distinction between acts and omissions,206 but this is the distinction the
Lambert Court made.
3. Smith and the First Amendment
In Smith, the defendant was the owner of a bookstore who was
convicted under an ordinance that criminalized possession of obscene
books.207 The ordinance did not require the defendant to know that the
book was obscene. Possession—even without knowledge of the book’s
contents—was sufficient to support conviction.208 As in Lambert, the
statute authorized punishment of the morally innocent, and as in Lambert
the Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.209 But this time the
Court relied on the fact that the statute threatened First Amendment
protections for freedom of speech. Although there is no First Amendment
right to possess obscene materials, the Court noted that a statute forbidding
such possession without any mens rea requirement will tend to inhibit the
bookseller’s willingness to carry many books that do enjoy First
Amendment protection. If the only way to avoid criminal liability is to
inspect every book one sells, a rational bookseller may limit his offering to
those books he actually has time to inspect.210 Because this strict liability
anti-obscenity statute had a strong “tendency to inhibit constitutionally
protected expression” the Supreme Court struck it down as
unconstitutional.211
4. Robinson and the Culpability Principle
Finally, the defendant in Robinson was convicted under a California
statute that made it a crime to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”212 The
206

See id. at 230–31 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Surely there can hardly be a
difference as a matter of fairness, of hardship, or of justice, if one may invoke it, between the
case of a person wholly innocent of wrongdoing, in the sense that he was not remotely
conscious of violating any law, who is imprisoned for five years for conduct relating to
narcotics, and the case of another person who is placed on probation for three years on
condition that she pay $250, for failure, as a local resident, convicted under local law of a
felony, to register under a law passed as an exercise of the State’s ‘police power.’”).
207
361 U.S. at 148–49.
208
Id. at 149 (quoting L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.01.1 (declared unconstitutional
1959)).
209
Id. at 155.
210
Id. at 153–54.
211
Id. at 155.
212
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
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statute did not require prosecutors to prove that the defendant ever
possessed or used narcotics within the state, just that he was found within
the state at a time when he was addicted.213 In other words, the statute
punished Robinson for the “status” of being addicted to narcotics.214 The
Supreme Court found that this statute violated the constitutional prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments because narcotics addiction was an
“illness” that could be contracted “innocently or involuntarily.”215
Although the state had the power to restrict the liberty of those with
illnesses that impact public health and safety, it did not have the power to
punish them for having such conditions.216 Just as the state could not
constitutionally impose punishment for the “crime of having a common
cold,” it could not impose punishment for the “crime” of being a narcotics
addict.217 In his concurrence, Justice Douglas asserted that narcotics addicts
are similar to the legally insane because they suffer from “compulsions”
that deprive them of the capacity to control their actions.218 Because
narcotics addicts were not morally responsible for their actions, they could
not constitutionally be punished for addiction.219
5. Summary
In these four cases, the Supreme Court moved toward full
constitutional enforcement of the culpability principle, but this progress
occurred on two separate tracks. In Morissette, Lambert, and Smith, the
Court struck down statutes that punished those who were morally innocent
because they lacked mens rea. Although the Court came close to holding
that mens rea is a constitutional prerequisite to criminal punishment, it
stopped just short of doing so and rested its decision in each case on a
separate rationale: statutory construction (Morissette), the action–omission
distinction (Lambert), or the First Amendment (Smith). In Robinson, on the
other hand, the Court actually held that it was unconstitutional to punish a
defendant in the absence of culpability. The Court did not base its decision
on the lack of a mens rea requirement, however, but on the sense that the
defendant himself was not a responsible moral agent, at least regarding his
narcotics addiction.
This holding appeared to represent a major,
213

Id. at 666.
Id.
215
Id. at 667.
216
Id. at 666.
217
Id. at 667.
218
Id. at 671, 676 (Douglas, J., concurring).
219
See id. at 677 (“A prosecution for addiction, with its resulting stigma and irreparable
damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a means of protecting
society, where a civil commitment would do as well.”).
214
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constitutionally mandated change to the concept of criminal responsibility,
and thus its implications were potentially much more radical and disruptive
to prevailing criminal law doctrines than would be any holding that the
Constitution requires proof of mens rea. As we shall see below, these
implications caused the Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas to step back from
its decision to enforce the culpability principle as a matter of constitutional
law.
C. POWELL V. TEXAS AND THE LIMITS OF THE CULPABILITY PRINCIPLE

In Powell v. Texas,220 a fractured Supreme Court simultaneously
reaffirmed the constitutional status of the culpability principle articulated in
Robinson and refused to enforce it.
Powell involved a defendant who was charged with public
intoxication.221 In his defense, Powell argued that he was an alcoholic, that
alcoholism was a disease like the narcotics addiction at issue in Robinson,
and that his public intoxication was simply a manifestation of this
disease.222 Just as the Robinson Court declared that it would be
unconstitutional to punish someone for the “‘crime’ of having a common
cold,” Powell argued that it should be unconstitutional for Texas to punish
him for exhibiting a symptom of alcoholism.223
To support this argument, Powell presented a psychiatrist to testify
about his alcoholism. The psychiatrist defined “chronic alcoholic” as “an
involuntary drinker, who is powerless not to drink, and who loses his selfcontrol over his drinking.”224 He testified that Powell was a “chronic
alcoholic, who by the time he has reached [the state of intoxication] . . . is
not able to control his behavior, and [who] . . . has reached this point
because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.”225 On crossexamination, the psychiatrist agreed that Powell’s decision to take the first
drink in any given drinking binge was a “voluntary exercise of his will,” but
then qualified this by saying “these individuals have a compulsion, and this
compulsion, while not completely overpowering, is a very strong influence,
an exceedingly strong influence.”226
Five Justices agreed with the proposition that chronic alcoholics could
not be punished for drinking because “[c]riminal penalties may not be

220
221
222
223
224
225
226

392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
change.”227 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed Powell’s conviction on the
ground that public intoxication involved some conduct—an appearance in
public—that could not clearly be attributed to Powell’s alcoholism.228
Although the ground of decision in Powell was narrow, the plurality
opinion raised broad concerns about the argument that a person could not
be held criminally responsible if his actions were caused by a “compulsion”
or “disease” like alcoholism. Powell knew right from wrong, and he knew
what he was doing when he decided to take a drink.229 Thus he could not be
said to lack mens rea, and his condition did not fall within the definition of
legal insanity that had been the rule in many states since the mid-nineteenth
century.230 A reversal of Powell’s conviction would have to be based on a
psychiatric version of the culpability principle that was far from universally
accepted within existing criminal law doctrine.
To enforce this version of the culpability principle, the plurality
argued, the Court would have to answer a series of seemingly
unanswerable—or at least highly contestable—questions. The two most
prominent were: (1) What counts as a disease or compulsion, as opposed to
a mere character flaw or personality trait?231 (2) What is the relationship
between a given “disease” or “compulsion” and a given defendant’s moral
227
Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Stewart); see id. at 548–49 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Unless Robinson is to
be abandoned, the use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal
law. Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol should not
be punishable for drinking or for being drunk.”).
228
Id. at 536–37 (plurality opinion). Justice White’s concurrence in the judgment argued
that Powell could not constitutionally be punished for drinking because this conduct was
caused by his alcoholism, but that he could be punished for appearing in public while drunk
because the record did not show that he could not have chosen to stay at home. See id. at
553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[N]othing in the record indicates that [Powell]
could not have done his drinking in private or that he was so inebriated at the time that he
had lost control of his movements and wandered into the public street.”). The plurality
opinion, by contrast, held that Powell could be punished for drinking even if the drinking
was “caused” by his alcoholism. Because Justice White’s position was the broadest ground
upon which a majority of the Justices agreed, it represents the actual holding of Powell.
229
Id. at 518 (plurality opinion).
230
See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719 (holding that a defendant
could be acquitted on the basis of insanity only if he was “labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or as not to know what he was doing was wrong”).
231
Powell, 392 U.S. at 522 (“[T]here is no agreement among members of the medical
profession about what it means to say that ‘alcoholism’ is a ‘disease.’ One of the principal
works in this field states that the major difficulty in articulating a ‘disease concept of
alcoholism’ is that ‘alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none.’
This same author concludes that ‘a disease is what the medical profession recognizes as
such.’” (emphasis omitted)).
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responsibility? In other words, at what point does the fact that the
defendant has a strong urge or proclivity to commit a forbidden act strip
him of moral responsibility for giving in to that urge?232
Underlying this difficulty was the fact that psychiatry and criminal law
operate under a different set of assumptions.233 Psychiatry assumes a
deterministic world in which all aberrant behavior—indeed all behavior—
can be explained through biological or environmental causes.234 Criminal
law, on the other hand, assumes that people possess free will and are
capable of making moral choices, except in extreme cases such as those
covered by the insanity defense. Were the Court to use the deterministic
assumptions of psychiatry as a basis for overturning Powell’s conviction,
this reasoning could be used to move entire categories of criminal behavior
outside of the criminal justice system.235 Indeed, it could transform the
entire criminal justice system from a “penal” system to a “therapeutic” one.
Such a result would not necessarily be good news for criminal defendants.
The plurality noted that if the government abandoned a punitive approach to
crime in favor of a therapeutic one, the result could actually be more
coercive in many cases: “One virtue of the criminal process is, at least, that
the duration of penal incarceration typically has some outside statutory
limit . . . . ‘Therapeutic civil commitment’ lacks this feature; one is
typically committed until one is ‘cured.’”236
The Powell plurality also worried about the institutional implications
of enforcing the psychiatric approach to culpability advocated by Powell.
By adopting such an approach, the Court could be forced to modify or
232

Id. at 526 (“It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will
begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is
quite another to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a drink, but that he also retains a
certain amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist.”).
233
See id. (“This definitional confusion reflects, of course, not merely the undeveloped
state of the psychiatric art but also the conceptual difficulties inevitably attendant upon the
importation of scientific and medical models into a legal system generally predicated upon a
different set of assumptions.”).
234
See American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983) (“Psychiatry is a deterministic discipline that views all human
behavior as, to a good extent, ‘caused.’”).
235
See Powell, 392 U.S. at 534 (“If Leroy Powell cannot be convicted of public
intoxication, it is difficult to see how a State can convict an individual for murder, if that
individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other respects, suffers from a
‘compulsion’ to kill, which is an ‘exceedingly strong influence,’ but ‘not completely
overpowering.’”). In fact, if all behavior is biologically or environmentally determined, it
would seem that no one could be punished on the basis of moral culpability. The logical end
result would be either the elimination of the criminal justice system or the abandonment of
culpability as the measure of criminal responsibility.
236
Id. at 529. This danger is vividly realized in the sexual predator commitment statute
described in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), discussed in Part II, supra.
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abandon several core criminal law doctrines. Traditional criminal elements
(such as actus reus and mens rea) and defenses (such as insanity, duress,
and mistake) developed over the centuries to determine the defendant’s
culpability in light of his conduct, state of mind, cognitive or volitional
infirmities, and the pressures he faced in the situation. The Powell plurality
expressed concern that the scope and application of such doctrines could be
significantly altered by adoption of Powell’s psychiatric approach to
culpability.237 Such alteration would be imposed on all fifty states and the
federal government as a matter of constitutional law.
In light of the limited nature of psychiatric knowledge and the highly
contested nature of the relationship between psychology and moral agency,
the Powell plurality felt it was unwise to adopt a psychiatric approach to
culpability. By constitutionally enforcing what the plurality saw as a
radical new approach to culpability, the Court would drastically alter the
relationship between the federal government and the states238 and turn the
Court into “the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal
responsibility.”239 The Powell plurality refused to take on this role.
D. THE CONTINUED VITALITY OF THE CULPABILITY PRINCIPLE

Since Powell, the Supreme Court’s efforts to enforce the culpability
principle in the context of strict liability crimes have been less ambitious
but more consistent. The Court has continued to maintain that criminal
punishment in the absence of culpability could violate the Constitution,240
but it has avoided deciding cases on a constitutional basis.
Methodologically, the Court has chosen the statutory construction of
Morissette over the constitutional interpretation of Lambert, Smith, and
Robinson. Substantively, the Court has returned to Morissette’s focus on
mens rea and avoided Robinson’s and Powell’s focus on psychology and
moral agency. Throughout this period, and up to today, the Court has
237
Id. at 535–36 (“We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of
interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the
moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus,
mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for
a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law
and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man.”).
238
See id. at 535 (“Traditional common-law concepts of personal accountability and
essential considerations of federalism lead us to disagree with appellant.”).
239
Id. at 533.
240
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (noting that
strict liability crimes do not “invariably” violate the constitution); United States v. Int'l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971) (noting that it “might raise substantial
due process questions” if Congress enacted a strict liability statute regarding conduct that
would not put a reasonable person on notice of the likelihood of regulation).
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sought to vindicate the culpability principle in two ways: (1) by creating a
stronger presumption of mens rea in criminal statutory interpretation,241 and
(2) by emphasizing the link between culpability and the justice of
punishment.242 But because the Court has limited itself to statutory
interpretation, its current approach provides no protection to defendants
prosecuted under state strict liability criminal statutes, nor even to federal
defendants prosecuted under statutes the Court has previously construed as
imposing strict liability, such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.243
The Supreme Court has held since the 1970s that strict liability crimes
are disfavored,244 and has applied a presumption that federal criminal
statutes require proof of mens rea even where they are silent as to this
requirement.245 Under this presumption, the Supreme Court interprets
federal criminal statutes that are silent regarding mens rea to require
prosecutors to prove that a defendant had a culpable state of mind.246
Where the conduct covered by the statute is neither inherently wrongful nor
dangerous, the Court interprets the statute to require actual knowledge of
241
Several commentators have praised the Court’s adoption of a presumption of mens
rea. See, e.g., Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme
Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 888 (1999); Stephen
F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 889 (2005) (noting that
the Supreme Court “uses heightened mens rea requirements to hard-wire into the definition
of the crime judicially enforceable protections for blameless conduct”); John Shepard Wiley,
Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1021, 1022 (1999); Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2434–35
(2006); cf. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes,
59 HAST. L.J. 137, 139 (2007) (“Although the apparent innocence rule is preferable to
outright strict liability, it is now apparent that it has fallen far short in practice of ensuring
mandatory culpability.”).
242
See cases cited infra note 245.
243
See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (upholding Dotterweich’s reading of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as imposing vicarious strict liability on corporate
officers).
244
See U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437–38 (“While strict-liability offenses are not
unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements . . .
[they have a] generally disfavored status.” (citations omitted)).
245
See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000) (noting the existence of a
“presumption in favor of scienter”); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994)
(“[W]e must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law, in
which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded.”); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (“[T]he failure of Congress explicitly and
unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a departure from this
background assumption of our criminal law.”); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438 (“[F]ar
more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is
necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.”).
246
See Carter, 530 U.S. at 269 (“The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to
read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from
‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”).
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the law. For example, in Liparota v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that a person could not be convicted of receiving food stamps without
proper authorization unless that person knew of the authorization
requirement.247 Because acquisition of food stamps was not “a type of
conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public
regulation [or one that] may seriously threaten the community’s health or
safety,”248 a person who was unaware of the requirement could not
reasonably be blamed for violating it. Thus the Court interpreted the statute
to permit conviction only if prosecutors proved that the defendant knew he
was violating the law.
On the other hand, where the conduct covered by the statute is
wrongful in itself, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to require
the lowest level of mens rea sufficient to ensure that only culpable
defendants are subject to prosecution. For example, in Carter v. United
States, the Court held that a federal statute prohibiting the taking of
property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation” did not
require proof of a specific intent to steal the property. 249 The Court held
that the mens rea presumption generally “requires a court to read into a
statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct
from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”250 Because it is wrongful to take
property by force, violence, or intimidation, there was no need for
prosecutors to prove anything more than the intent to do so.
The Supreme Court has continued to follow the holding in Smith v.
California that a heightened level of mens rea is required where a criminal
statute implicates conduct protected by the First Amendment. In United
States v. X-Citement Video,251 the defendant was convicted of distributing
child pornography for selling sexually explicit videotapes starring an
underage actress to an undercover FBI agent.252 The Court of Appeals held
that the statute was unconstitutional because it permitted conviction for
knowingly distributing a video without requiring proof that the defendant
knew both (1) that the video contained depictions of sexually explicit
conduct and (2) that one of the actors shown engaging in sexually explicit
conduct was underage.253 To preserve the constitutionality of the statute,
the Supreme Court reinterpreted the statute to require knowledge of both

247
248
249
250
251
252
253

See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
Id. at 433.
Carter, 530 U.S. at 268 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006)).
Id. at 269.
513 U.S. 64 (1994).
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 67.
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facts. The Court noted that it would be “absurd”254 to suppose that
Congress intended to punish people such as Federal Express carriers who
delivered such videotapes without knowing that they contained
pornography, for such people are morally innocent.255 Moreover, because
distribution of “nonobscene” pornography is protected by the First
Amendment, the Court interpreted the statute to require knowledge of the
facts that took the defendant’s conduct outside the scope of constitutional
protection, namely, the ages of the victims.256
The Supreme Court has interpreted even public welfare offenses to
require a sufficiently blameworthy state of mind to satisfy the culpability
principle. In such cases, the Court dispenses with the presumption of mens
rea only where the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently wrongful or
dangerous that he can fairly be blamed for failing to realize it is regulated.
For example, in United States v. Freed, the Court interpreted a federal
statute criminalizing the possession of unregistered hand grenades to
require proof that the defendant knew he possessed a hand grenade, but not
proof that he knew of the registration requirement.257 Hand grenades are
sufficiently dangerous to put the defendant on notice that unrestricted
ownership is probably not allowed: “One would hardly be surprised to learn
that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.”258 Similarly, in
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corporation,259 the
Court interpreted a statute criminalizing shipment of mislabeled acid to
require proof that the defendant knew he was shipping acid, but not that he
knew of the labeling requirement: “[W]here . . . dangerous or deleterious
devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of
the regulation.”260 Where the defendant’s conduct is so dangerous or
wrongful that he should be aware that it is regulated, his failure to realize
this fact is sufficiently culpable that he can constitutionally be punished.
But if a law prohibits conduct that is innocuous in itself, the Court

254

Id. at 69.
The Supreme Court’s hypothetical Federal Express carrier is not unlike the
hypothetical UPS delivery man described in Part I, supra, as being prosecuted under
Florida’s strict liability narcotics statute.
256
Id. at 78.
257
401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971).
258
Id. at 609.
259
402 U.S. 558 (1971).
260
Id. at 565.
255
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observed, a statute that punished it without requiring actual knowledge of
the prohibition would raise “substantial due process questions.”261
Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the reason it employs a presumption of mens rea is to avoid the injustice of
imposing punishment without culpability.262 The Court discussed the link
between a mens rea requirement and the justice of punishment in Staples v.
United States.263 In Staples, the defendant possessed a semiautomatic rifle
that had been modified into a machine gun.264 He was charged with
possession of an unregistered machine gun, a felony with a maximum
sentence of ten years imprisonment.265 Staples claimed he did not know
that the gun was capable of operating as a machine gun.266 The question in
the case was whether the National Firearms Act required proof that the
defendant knew his gun was fully automatic, or whether it simply required
proof that he knew it was a gun.267 The Supreme Court concluded that the
statute required knowledge that the gun was fully automatic. Given the
widespread private ownership of guns in this country, and their legitimate
use for hunting or self-defense, gun ownership was not sufficiently
dangerous or deleterious to put the defendant on notice of the likelihood of
regulation.268 Only knowledge that the gun was actually a machine gun
would be sufficient to provide such notice, and therefore the Court required
proof of such knowledge.269
In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the harsh punishment
authorized under this statute. Possession of an unregistered machine gun
was a felony with a ten-year maximum sentence: “In a system that generally
requires a ‘vicious will’ to establish a crime, imposing severe punishments
for offenses that require no mens rea would seem incongruous.”270 Because

261

Id. at 564 (“Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be
the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not
require . . . ‘mens rea’ as to each ingredient of the offense.”).
262
See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (purpose of the
presumption of mens rea is avoidance of “the risk of punishing seemingly innocent
conduct”); see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY
L.J. 753, 754 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he [Supreme] Court has been interpreting mens rea to
protect the morally innocent if the sentencing guidelines would likely require imprisonment
upon conviction”).
263
511 U.S. 600 (1994).
264
Id. at 603.
265
Id. at 602–03.
266
Id. at 603.
267
Id.
268
See id. at 608–16.
269
Id. at 619.
270
Id. at 616–17.
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the degree of punishment is supposed to reflect the degree of culpability, 271
it makes no sense to interpret a statute as authorizing ten years in prison for
defendants who have no knowledge of the facts that make their conduct
wrongful. The Court noted (as it had in Morissette) that “felony” is “as bad
a word as you can give to man or thing,”272 and that imprisonment was a
punishment historically reserved for “infamous crimes.”273
It was
“incongruous” (to say the least) to label someone as a felon and impose an
“infamous” punishment on him without ever proving that he was morally
culpable.
Despite enforcing a fairly strong presumption of mens rea, the
Supreme Court has remained ambivalent regarding the constitutional status
of the culpability principle. Lambert and Robinson have not been
overturned, but they have not given rise to a significant line of
constitutional culpability cases. The Court periodically implies that a
statute that directly contravened the culpability principle might be
unconstitutional.274 On the other hand, the Court has never overturned
Balint or Dotterweich. In fact, in United States v. Park,275 the Court upheld
Dotterweich’s ruling that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
imposes vicarious strict liability on responsible corporate officers.276
Because the presumption of mens rea is predicated on statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional interpretation, it does not directly
affect state criminal statutes and it does not prevent Congress from enacting
strict liability criminal statutes so long as it clearly expresses its intent to do
so. What Herbert Packer wryly observed of the Court’s approach in 1962
remains true today: “Mens rea is an important requirement, but it is not a
constitutional requirement, except sometimes.”277
V. WHAT IS AN ELEMENT? THE CULPABILITY PRINCIPLE, THE BURDEN OF
PROOF, AND THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
One implication of the culpability principle is that the burden of proof
in criminal cases should be higher than in civil cases. As discussed in Part
271
The question of proportionality between culpability and punishment is discussed more
fully in Part VI, infra.
272
Id. at 618.
273
Id. at 617.
274
See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971).
275
421 U.S. 658 (1975).
276
Id. at 673 (referencing Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, 1042 (1938)) (“Congress has seen fit to
enforce the accountability of responsible corporate agents dealing with products which may
affect the health of consumers by penal sanctions cast in rigorous terms, and the obligation
of the courts is to give them effect so long as they do not violate the Constitution.”).
277
Packer, supra note 12, at 107.
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III, the key distinction between criminal and civil cases is that the former
impose punishment whereas the latter merely impose liability. Put
differently, the central question in a civil case is typically who should bear
the cost of repairing an injury or furthering a social goal. The central
question in a criminal case, on the other hand, is who should bear the blame
for committing an unlawful act. Since social costs have to be borne by
someone, it may be just to require that they be borne by the person who is
most likely to have caused them, even if we are not certain that this person
is responsible. But before we inflict formal societal blame on someone—
before we label him as a criminal—we should be as certain as reasonably
possible that he is guilty.
The Supreme Court formally announced in In re Winship that the Due
Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of “every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged.”278
The Winship Court predicated this holding explicitly on the culpability
principle.
Because criminal punishment involved not only the
279
“possibility”
that the defendant would lose his liberty but also the
“certainty that he would be stigmatized,”280 courts could not use a burden of
proof standard that would “leave[] people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned.”281 The “moral force of the criminal law” would be
“diluted” by the use of a lower burden of proof.282 In concurrence, Justice
Harlan wrote that our criminal justice system is “bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”283
Winship is replete with language associated with the culpability
principle: Criminal law performs a “moral” function.284 Those convicted of
crime are “condemned”285 and “stigmatized.”286 For this reason, the law
should take extra care to avoid conviction of the “innocent.”287 And yet
there is an ambiguity at the heart of Winship, the same ambiguity we saw in
the strict liability cases discussed in Part IV above. Despite the Court’s use
of the language of culpability, its actual holding in the case—that “every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 364 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).

704

JOHN F. STINNEFORD

[Vol. 102

charged”288 must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt—does not preclude
an instrumentalist approach to criminal law. A legislature could choose to
eliminate an element central to culpability (such as mens rea) or reclassify it
as an affirmative defense or sentencing factor and still comply with the
literal terms of Winship, so long as the remaining elements are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, such an action would
undermine the moral concerns that gave rise to the reasonable doubt
standard in the first place. Winship left open the question of whether the
Due Process Clause limits the power of the legislature to evade the
reasonable doubt standard by eliminating elements or reclassifying them as
affirmative defenses or sentencing factors.
This question was raised a few years later in Mullaney v. Wilbur.289
Wilbur killed a man in a hotel room, apparently in reaction to the victim’s
sexual advances.290 Maine’s homicide statute defined murder as an
unlawful homicide “with malice aforethought.”291 It defined manslaughter
as an unlawful homicide committed “in the heat of passion, on sudden
provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought.”292 Maine’s
Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the statute as imposing a presumption
that every intentional homicide was committed with malice aforethought.293
The defendant could negate this presumption by proving that he acted in the
heat of passion upon adequate provocation.294 The United States Supreme
Court invalidated this burden-shifting scheme, holding that it violated
Winship’s reasonable doubt requirement by forcing the defendant to
disprove the existence of a key element of the offense. The question of
whether the defendant acted in the heat of passion upon adequate
provocation had been considered “the single most important factor in
determining the degree of culpability” for homicide “almost from the
inception of the common law of homicide.”295 Maine still considered this
question central to the defendant’s culpability, since the distinction between
murder and manslaughter rested upon it.296 Maine considered murderers

288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id. at 364 (majority opinion).
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 686 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
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more “‘blameworth[y]’” than manslaughterers and subjected them to much
harsher punishment.297
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Winship did not apply
to this case because Maine law did not consider “heat of passion” an
element but a partial affirmative defense that affected only sentencing. 298
Winship was concerned with “substance” rather than “formalism,”299 the
Court held, and therefore the question of whether a given fact was an
element did not depend on how it was “defined by state law.”300 Otherwise
the state “could undermine many of the interests that [Winship] sought to
protect” by redefining the key elements of a crime as sentencing factors. 301
Because the question of whether the defendant killed in the “heat of
passion” determined the defendant’s degree of culpability and the extent of
his punishment, it was an element that had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mullaney was similar to its decision
in Robinson (discussed in Part IV.B above) in that it rejected a tradition as a
source for defining and limiting the application of the culpability
principle.302 Prior to Mullaney, the burden of proving affirmative defenses
had often been placed on the defendant.303 These included not only the
provocation defense at issue in Mullaney,304 but other traditional affirmative
defenses like insanity305 and self-defense.306 Maine’s own practice of

297
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 671, 673 (Me.
1973) (Wernick, J., concurring)).
298
Id.
299
Id. at 699.
300
Id. at 698.
301
Id.
302
Mullaney engendered significant academic commentary about its possible
implications for constitutional criminal law. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In
re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New
York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 32 (1977) (noting the disruptive impact the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Mullaney could have on criminal law doctrine).
303
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (Noting that “at common law
the burden of proving the [provocation defense], as well as other affirmative defenses
indeed, ‘all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation’ rested on the defendant.
This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.” (citations omitted)).
304
See id.
305
See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797–98 (1952) (noting that “[i]n most of the
nineteenth-century American cases . . . the defendant was required to ‘clearly’ prove
insanity” and that some twenty states continued to place the burden of proving insanity on
the defendant); M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719 (“[E]very man is
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his
crimes, until the contrary be proved to [the jury’s] satisfaction”).
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requiring the defendant to prove the provocation defense was over a
hundred years old.307 In fact, the Supreme Court itself had previously
approved a statute giving the defendant the burden of proving the insanity
defense.308 The Supreme Court’s holding in Mullaney threatened to
invalidate hundreds of years of criminal law doctrine relating to affirmative
defenses and to overturn the Supreme Court’s own precedent relating to this
issue, all in the name of the culpability principle.
Two years later the Supreme Court retreated. In Patterson v. New
York,309 the Court reinterpreted Winship and Mullaney as turning purely on
the formal distinction between elements and defenses. Patterson presented
almost precisely the same issue the Court decided in Mullaney: whether the
state could require the defendant to prove that his intentional homicide
should be treated as manslaughter because the defendant acted in the heat of
passion. Patterson discovered his wife with the victim in a state of “semiundress” and immediately shot the victim twice in the head, killing him.310
Under the applicable New York statutes, an intentional homicide was
considered murder unless the defendant could prove that he acted “under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.”311 The defendant argued
that his case was indistinguishable from Mullaney312: under both statutory
schemes, the prosecution had the burden of proving that the defendant
committed an intentional homicide, and the defendant had the burden of
proving the partial defense of heat of passion or emotional disturbance.
Under both statutes, the defendant’s success in proving this defense
determined both the amount of culpability attributed to the defendant and
the amount of punishment he would receive. Thus Patterson argued that the
prosecution should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did not act under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.
The Supreme Court ruled against Patterson, noting that Maine’s
murder statute made “malice aforethought” an element of the offense while
306

See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235 (1987) (noting that “the common-law rule was
that affirmative defenses, including self-defense, were matters for the defendant to prove”).
307
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688.
308
Leland, 343 U.S. 790.
309
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
310
Id. at 198.
311
Id. at 198 n.2. This language was taken from the Model Penal Code’s reformulation
of the “heat of passion” defense, which made the defense theoretically applicable in a
broader range of cases by eliminating the requirement that the victim wrongfully provoke the
defendant and that the defendant act before he had reasonable time to “cool off.” Neither of
these distinctions would have made any difference to Patterson’s case, which fell within one
of the most traditional “heat of passion categories,” discovery of one’s spouse in an act of
adultery.
312
Id. at 201.
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New York’s murder statute did not.313 Maine’s requirement that the
defendant prove the provocation defense in order to negate the presumption
of malice shifted the burden on a statutory element, but New York’s
requirement that the defendant prove the “extreme emotional disturbance”
defense did not.
This holding amounted to a purely formalistic
reinterpretation of Winship and Mullaney. According to the Patterson
Court, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt only applies to
facts that the legislature designates as elements, regardless of the actual role
those facts play in determining the defendant’s culpability and
punishment.314
The Patterson Court recognized that its formalistic approach to burden
of proof created the risk that legislatures might redefine statutes in such a
way as to create a higher risk of punishing innocent defendants.315 But it
considered this risk to be outweighed by the burden that a contrary decision
would place on state criminal justice systems. The principle championed
by the defendant seemed to have no limit to its application.316 If the Court
required prosecutors to prove every fact relevant to culpability beyond a
reasonable doubt, it would have to invalidate the rules governing
affirmative defenses that had been followed in many states over a period of
centuries. Such a sweeping change was not justified by tradition, as the
common law traditionally placed the burden of proving affirmative defenses
on the defendant.317 To avoid the disruption threatened by Mullaney’s
application of the culpability principle, the Patterson Court reinterpreted
Winship and Mullaney to cover only the burden of proving facts that the
legislature had formally defined as elements. This negated the threat posed
by the culpability principle, but also negated nearly all of the value of
Winship and Mullaney.
After Patterson, the Supreme Court seemed willing to give the
legislature almost complete free rein to decide which facts are elements and
which are not. In a number of cases, it upheld statutes that made the judge
rather than the jury the finder of facts that triggered significant
enhancements of the defendant’s punishment. These included statutes
313

Id. at 215–16.
The Patterson Court acknowledged that the legislature’s power to redefine the
elements of an offense was subject to “constitutional limits,” but the only limits the Court
mentioned were that the legislature may not declare an individual guilty of an offense or
declare that the issuance of an indictment or the proof of the defendant’s identity creates a
presumption of guilt. Id. at 210. The Court pointedly failed to say that the legislature lacks
the power to transform elements relevant to culpability into defenses or sentencing factors.
315
Id. at 208.
316
See id. (“Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”).
317
Id. at 202.
314
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where the fact found by the judge triggered a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence,318 subjected the defendant to the possibility of the death
penalty,319 or increased the maximum sentence from two to twenty years.320
The Supreme Court reversed course once again, however, in the line of
cases starting with Apprendi v. New Jersey321 and culminating in United
States v. Booker.322 In these cases the Court struck down a number of
statutes that predicated an increase in the defendant’s punishment on a
judicial finding of a given fact.323 These statutes—some of which were
virtually identical to those the Court had upheld over the prior decade—
were held unconstitutional because they impermissibly reclassified an
element of the offense as a sentencing factor. As the Court asserted in Ring
v. Arizona: “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the
State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”324
In some ways, the Apprendi line of cases looks like a repudiation of
Patterson and a reaffirmation of the original holding in Mullaney. In these
cases, the Supreme Court rejected Patterson’s formalism, holding that the
label the legislature attaches to a given fact was not dispositive in
determining whether it is an element.325 Rather, the key question was
whether the fact increased the degree of punishment authorized for the
crime.326 If so, that fact was an element, and the constitutional requirements
of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied to it.327

318
See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (upholding a statute that required
a five-year mandatory minimum sentence where the judge found that the defendant visibly
possessed a firearm during commission of a specified felony).
319
See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (upholding a statute that called for the
judge to find the existence of aggravating factors that subjected the defendant to the death
penalty).
320
See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (interpreting federal
statute to increase the maximum penalty for illegal reentry into the United States from two to
twenty years where the judge has found that the defendant was convicted of an aggravated
felony prior to his initial deportation).
321
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
322
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
323
The relationship of the Winship–Mullaney–Patterson line of cases to the Apprendi–
Booker cases is also discussed in Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A Hastert, From Winship to
Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV.
195 (2005).
324
536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
325
See id.
326
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
327
Id. The only type of fact that the Apprendi Court excluded from this holding was the
fact of a defendant’s prior conviction.
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On the other hand, the constitutional focus of the Apprendi–Booker
line of cases differed fundamentally from that of Winship and Mullaney, in
that the Apprendi Court made almost no reference to the culpability
principle. Although the Court based its holding partly on the right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,328 its primary focus was on the right to a jury
trial.329 The Court asserted that the right to a jury trial was adopted because
jury members are private citizens who can serve as a buffer between the
defendant and the state.330 By requiring that a jury find the existence of
every fact that authorizes an increase in punishment, the Constitution
protects defendants against the possibility of government oppression.331
The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi to focus on the libertyprotecting function of the jury rather than the innocence-protecting function
of the reasonable doubt standard enabled it to provide enhanced protection
for defendants without being forced to invalidate broad areas of traditional
criminal law doctrine. In fact, the Court took pains in Apprendi to show
that its definition of “element” would not go farther than traditional
common law doctrine in requiring facts relevant to punishment to be
decided by the jury.332 At common law, any fact that increased the
defendant’s punishment had to be alleged in the charging document and
proven to a jury.333 Under Apprendi, by contrast, the judge retained
discretion to increase the defendant’s punishment based on facts not proven
to a jury, so long as the sentence remained within the range authorized by
the statute.334 Apprendi’s liberty-based holding was much easier to
incorporate into the existing criminal justice system than Mullaney’s
culpability-based holding would have been.
Although Apprendi’s approach to legislative manipulation of the
offense elements is less disruptive than Mullaney’s, it is also far less
protective. Apprendi restricts the legislature’s ability to reclassify an
element as a sentencing factor, but it does not appear to restrict the
328

See id. at 477; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 230; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 301 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 600 (2002).
329
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477–83.
330
See id. at 477 (noting that the purpose of the right to a jury trial is to “guard against a
spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers” and to serve “as the great bulwark of
[our] civil and political liberties” (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873))).
331
See id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The founders of the American Republic were
not prepared to leave [the criminal justice system] to the State, which is why the jury-trial
guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never
been efficient; but it has always been free.”).
332
Id. at 479 (majority opinion).
333
Id. at 479–80.
334
Id. at 481.
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legislature’s ability to reclassify an element as an affirmative defense.
Apprendi has not changed Patterson’s holding that the legislature may put
the burden on the defendant of disproving virtually any fact, so long as that
fact is not labeled as an element.335 Because the jury will ultimately decide
the factual question regardless of whether the fact is treated as an element
or an affirmative defense, the core concerns of Apprendi are arguably not
implicated by such legislative manipulation. Legislatures appear to remain
free to shift the burden of proof to the defendant by reclassifying elements
closely associated with culpability, including mens rea, as affirmative
defenses.336
Moreover, the restrictions Apprendi and Booker place on the power of
legislatures to reclassify elements as sentencing factors are not as strong as
they seem. So long as the reclassification allows judges to retain some
discretion not to apply these factors in any given case, the Apprendi–Booker
line of cases provides no bar. This line of cases explicitly holds that judges
have the power to engage in fact-finding that will affect the defendant’s
sentence, so long as the fact-finding does not cause the sentence to be
greater than that authorized by the statute under which the defendant was
convicted.337 A legislature that wishes to bypass the jury and the reasonable
doubt standard can simply enact a basic criminal statute authorizing a wide
range of sentences, and then give the judge discretion to impose any
sentence within that range based on facts the judge finds at sentencing by a
preponderance of the evidence. So long as the judge is not required to
increase the sentence based on these facts, the statute will satisfy the
requirements of the Apprendi–Booker line of cases.338
This is precisely what the current federal sentencing system does.
Numerous federal statutes authorize a long maximum sentence for crimes
(such as mail fraud)339 that encompass a broad range of conduct involving

335

See id. at 485 n.12.
Florida’s strict liability drug-trafficking statute, see supra Part I, does precisely this.
337
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
338
The Apprendi Court acknowledged that its holding permits legislatures to engage in
this sort of manipulation, but dismissed the concern on the ground that “structural
democratic constraints exist to discourage legislatures from enacting penal statutes that
expose every defendant convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum
sentence exceeding that which is, in the legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the
crime.” Id. at 490 n.16. The Court’s assurance that democratic accountability will serve as a
constraint on “potentially harsh legislative action,” id., seems remarkably naïve or
disingenuous in light of the tidal wave of criminal statutes authorizing extremely harsh
penalties that has washed over the state and federal criminal justice systems over the past
forty years, generally with strong popular support.
339
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (authorizing punishment of up to twenty years for a
single mail fraud violation).
336
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varying degrees of culpability. The federal sentencing guidelines contain a
long list of culpability-related facts that may be found at sentencing and
advise the judge as to the specific weight to be given each fact at
sentencing.340 Judges retain discretion to depart from the guidelines, so
long as these departures are “reasonable” in light of the statutory purposes
of sentencing.341 Under this system, many of the facts that have the greatest
impact on the actual sentence to be served by the defendant are never
presented to the jury and are proved under a mere preponderance of the
evidence standard.342
As in the mens rea cases discussed in Part IV, the Supreme Court’s
protection against legislative manipulation of the elements of an offense is
imperfect at best. In both sets of cases, the Court attempted to use the
culpability principle to provide constitutional protections for criminal
defendants, but did not use tradition as a guide for defining and limiting the
scope of the culpability principle. In both sets of cases, the Court had to
retreat from this effort once it realized the disruption the effort would cause
to a broad range of traditional criminal law doctrines. Finally, in both sets
of cases, the Court sought to protect the basic values underlying the
culpability principle through compromise measures. In the mens rea cases,
the Court enforced the culpability principle primarily through statutory
construction. In the elemental manipulation cases, the Court focused on the
structural protections provided by the jury. But in both sets of cases, the
Court allowed legislatures ample room to subvert the culpability principle
through crafty drafting of criminal statutes. We will see this pattern repeat
itself one more time in the Supreme Court’s cases regarding proportionality
in sentencing, discussed immediately below.

340

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010) (listing a range of factors
to be considered in sentencing for mail fraud and similar crimes).
341
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005); see also Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (“[W]hile the statute still requires a court to give respectful
consideration to the Guidelines . . . Booker permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of
other statutory concerns as well.”).
342
For example, the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 sets the “base
offense level” for mail fraud at 7, which translates into a sentencing range of zero to six
months for a first-time offender. If a defendant met all of the aggravating factors listed in
§ 2B1.1, his offense level would increase from 7 to 77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2B1.1. The recommended sentence for someone with an offense level of 43 or
above is life imprisonment. See id. § 5 pt. A. Since the statutory maximum sentence for a
mail fraud violation is twenty years, such a defendant would receive a twenty-year sentence
under the guidelines. In this situation, only one-fortieth of the guidelines sentence (six
months) would result from the facts proven at trial. By contrast, thirty-nine-fortieths of the
sentence (nineteen and a half years) of the guidelines sentence would result from facts
proven to a judge at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.
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VI. THE CULPABILITY PRINCIPLE AND PROPORTIONALITY IN PUNISHMENT
If it is unjust to impose punishment in the absence of culpability, it is
also unjust to impose punishment in excess of culpability. Because
punishment is the community’s expression of moral condemnation or blame
through the imposition of sanctions, there should be some relationship
between the degree of blameworthiness and the degree of punishment. A
pickpocket is not as blameworthy as a murderer and should not be punished
as harshly.343
The Supreme Court has recognized for more than a century that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits punishments that are
excessive in relation to the defendant’s culpability.344 As will be shown
below, the Court’s effort to enforce the culpability principle followed a
similar pattern in its proportionality cases as in the mens rea and elemental
manipulation cases discussed above. The Court first sought to enforce the
principle directly as a matter of constitutional law while explicitly rejecting
tradition as a source of constitutional standards. It then retreated from this
position in the face of the disruption it threatened to cause, and finally the
Court settled on a middle ground that promotes the culpability principle in a
weak and unprincipled fashion.
From the beginning, the Supreme Court’s proportionality
jurisprudence has been based on the culpability principle. For example, in
Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a Philippine statute
that imposed the punishment of “cadena temporal” for the crime of
knowingly making a false entry in a public record.345 This crime did not
require that the defendant “injure . . . or intend . . . to injure anyone,” nor
did it require “any fraud nor even the desire to defraud, nor intention of
personal gain on the part of the person committing it.”346 “Cadena
temporal” required a minimum punishment of twelve years imprisonment
doing “hard and painful labor” while wearing shackles and chains, followed

343

The idea that justice requires proportionality in punishment is an ancient one with
strong acceptance throughout Western history. See, e.g., Exodus 21:25; Leviticus 24:19–20
(“An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth.”); 4 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
304 (English Dominican Fathers trans., Burns, Oates & Washbourne 1929) (1264) (“[T]he
punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may receive a punishment in
contrast with that for love of which it sinned.”); V ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS ch. 3
(Roger Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (350 B.C.E.) (“What is just in this sense,
then, is what is proportionate. And what is unjust is what violates the proportion.”); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *15; 2 BRACTON, supra note 28, at 299 (“It is the duty of the
judge to impose a sentence no more and no less severe than the case demands.”).
344
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
345
Id. at 363.
346
Id.
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by a lifetime of civil disabilities and subjection to state supervision.347 The
Court held that the imposition of this extremely severe punishment for an
offense involving such a small degree of culpability was cruel and unusual:
“Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who . . . believe that it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense.”348 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
explicitly refused to rely on tradition as a source of constitutional standards,
stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “may be . . .
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”349
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court started thinking
seriously about what it means to say that a punishment is disproportionate
to the defendant’s culpability. Although it seems obviously true to say that
a major penalty should not be given for a minor offense—for example, a
life sentence should not be given for a parking violation—any effort to
move beyond this level of generality involves one in a series of difficult
problems: How do we compare punishment and culpability against each
other? Are the two concepts even commensurable? By what common scale
should they be measured?
In Gregg v. Georgia,350 a plurality of the Supreme Court attempted to
solve this problem by setting forth a two-part analysis that the Court
continues to use (in modified form) today. First, the plurality asked an
“objective” question: Does the punishment comport with current “standards
of decency,” as indicated by legislative action, jury verdicts, and similar
indicia of contemporary moral standards?351 Second, it asked a subjective
question: Does the punishment comport with the “dignity of man” or is it
unconstitutionally excessive in the Court’s judgment?352 By framing its
analysis this way, the plurality hoped to determine proportionality questions

347

Id. at 364.
Id. at 366–67. Although there has been some controversy concerning whether Weems
should be considered a proportionality case or a case involving inherently cruel methods of
punishment, Margaret Raymond has established that Weems was seen in its own time as a
proportionality case. See Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in American Legislation”:
Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251, 293–95
(2006).
349
Weems, 217 U.S. at 378. Forty-eight years later, in Trop v. Dulles, a plurality of the
Court made this rejection of tradition more explicit by stating that the Eighth Amendment
should be interpreted according to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
350
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
351
Id. at 173, 179–82 (citation omitted).
352
Id. at 173 (citation omitted).
348
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in a way that was not purely subjective, but that was also not completely
reliant on the vicissitudes of current public opinion.
In several death penalty cases, this dual approach to proportionality
analysis seemed to serve the Court well. In Gregg v. Georgia, the plurality
held that the death penalty was not grossly disproportionate to the crime of
murder, because legislative actions and jury verdicts showed strong societal
support for it and because the punishment fit the crime in the Court’s own
judgment.353 In Coker v. Georgia, on the other hand, the Court invalidated
a statute imposing the death penalty for simple rape because Georgia was
the only state that still authorized this punishment for this crime and
because the Court did not consider rapists to be as culpable as murderers.354
Finally, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court invalidated the death penalty for
felony murder where the defendant neither intended nor directly caused the
death, because this punishment had been rejected in the vast majority of
states and because such defendants did not deserve the death penalty in the
Court’s judgment.355
The ease with which the Supreme Court reached its conclusion in
these cases masked the deeply problematic nature of its approach to
measuring proportionality. In each case, the Court could plausibly assert
that both the objective and the subjective prongs of its analysis supported its
decision. But the concurrence of the objective and subjective prongs in
these cases was pure coincidence. It was unclear what would happen if
public opinion strongly supported a punishment that the Court believed
contrary to the “dignity of man.” Would current “standards of decency”
prevail over the Court’s judgment, or vice versa?
The inadequacy of the Gregg approach to comparing punishment with
culpability was further masked by the nature of the punishments in Gregg,
Coker, and Enmund. All three cases involved the death penalty, the
category of punishment for which it is easiest to make an intuitive
comparison between culpability and punishment. One of the oldest and
most recognizable statements of retributive proportionality is “an eye for an
eye; a tooth for a tooth.”356 Although we do not literally follow this

353

Id. (noting that the death penalty “is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme
of crimes”).
354
433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment;
but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”).
355
458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“It is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be
punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’ Enmund did not kill
or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who
killed.” (internal citations omitted)).
356
See Exodus 21:25; Leviticus 24:19–20.
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prescription today, it is relatively easy to translate it to “a death for a death,”
or at least “a death for an intentional murder.” In this light, the results in
Gregg, Coker, and Enmund seemed intuitively obvious. But when the
crime is not murder and the punishment is prison rather than death, it is
much more difficult to find a reliable standard for measuring punishment
against culpability. How much time in prison does a burglar deserve?
What about a small-time fraudster, check forger, or shoplifter? How much
punishment does a recidivist deserve as compared to a first offender? Mere
recitation of the phrase “an eye for an eye” does not help answer these
questions.
As the Court came to focus on this issue, it sought to abandon or
reduce the scope of its proportionality jurisprudence. For example, in
Rummel v. Estelle357 the Court strongly implied that the proportionality
requirements of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to cases involving
sentences of imprisonment. In Rummel, the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment under a recidivist statute after being convicted of obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses.358 Rummel argued that it was unconstitutional
to impose such a severe punishment for such a minor offense.359 The
Supreme Court responded by questioning whether there is any discernable
constitutional distinction between “major” and “minor” offenses and
whether a court is capable of determining how much punishment a given
crime deserves.360 Although Rummel’s crime was nonviolent and involved
a small amount of money, the Court noted these characteristics did not
necessarily show that Rummel was less culpable than other criminals
subjected to life sentences. A number of “major” crimes do not involve
violence.361
As for the dollar amount involved, a small-time or
unsuccessful fraudster may be “be no less blameworthy” than a large-scale
fraudster, “only less skillful.”362 Rummel himself was a recidivist, a fact
that tended to show that he was more morally culpable than less
experienced offenders.363 Finally, the Court questioned whether it was
capable of determining how much punishment any given crime deserved:
“Penologists themselves have been unable to agree whether sentences
should be light or heavy, discretionary or determinate. This uncertainty
reinforces our conviction that any ‘nationwide trend’ toward lighter,

357
358
359
360
361
362
363

445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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discretionary sentences must find its source and its sustaining force in the
legislatures, not in the federal courts.”364
In the eyes of the Rummel Court, the difficulty of measuring
punishment against culpability—at least without the guidance of tradition—
threatened to make its proportionality jurisprudence just as disruptive of the
criminal justice system as its prior decisions in Robinson and Mullaney. As
in those cases, the Court was being asked to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature based on a free-floating moral principle. There seemed to
be no “neutral principle of adjudication”365 that could prevent
proportionality review from becoming the mere substitution of the Court’s
policy preferences for those of the legislature. Although the “evolving
standards of decency” prong of the Court’s analysis was supposed to protect
against this danger, its actual capacity to do so was unclear.366
Rummel was followed by a period of deep instability in the Supreme
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence that to some degree persists to this
day. The Court has not abandoned proportionality review, even in the
context of prison sentences,367 but it also has not found a reliable method
for measuring proportionality.368 Instead it has tried to find new ways to
reduce the appearance that proportionality review allows the Court to
supplant the primary role of the legislature in determining the appropriate
sentence for a given crime. For a time the Court eliminated the subjective
prong of the Gregg test, focusing solely on whether the punishment violated
current “standards of decency.”369 But when this approach proved to be
insufficiently protective of criminal offenders,370 the Court reverted to using
364

Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 267 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1201 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Thornberry, J., dissenting)).
366
See id. at 281–82 (questioning the value of determining current standards of decency
through an interjurisdictional comparison of the authorized punishments for a given crime:
“Even were we to assume that the statute employed against Rummel was the most stringent
found in the 50 States, that severity hardly would render Rummel’s punishment ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to his offenses or to the punishment he would have received in the other
States. . . . Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of
federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more
severely than any other State.”).
367
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
368
See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 1, at 917–26.
369
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (“In determining what standards
have ‘evolved,’ however, we have looked not to our own conceptions of decency, but to
those of modern American society as a whole.”), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989).
370
As several scholars have pointed out, one of the major flaws of the evolving standards
of decency test is that it relies on majority will to protect criminal defendants from
punishments authorized by majority will. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
365
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its “own judgment” once again.371 The Court also adopted a highly
deferential standard of review in proportionality cases,372 but has only used
this standard in prison cases, not those involving the death penalty.373
Most significantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court has reduced
the importance of the culpability principle by declaring that retribution is
merely one of four rationales from which a legislature can choose in
determining the maximum permissible sentence for a crime. For nearly a
century, the key question in the Court’s proportionality analysis was
whether the punishment matched the defendant’s culpability for committing
the crime of which he was convicted.374 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court
DISTRUST 69 (1980) (“[I]t makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as
the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 88 n.200
(1989) (“The preferences of the majority should not determine the nature of the [E]ighth
[A]mendment or of any other constitutional right.”); Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of
Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National
Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (2006) (“[D]eclaring an action unconstitutional
because a significant number of states prohibit the practice leaves the Supreme Court
enforcing constitutional protections only in cases where they are least needed.”); Michael S.
Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63
(2008) (“The rights enshrined in the Madisonian compromise are supposed to be good
against the majority. It does not make sense to give a majoritarian interpretation of minority
rights against the majority.”).
371
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (“[I]n cases involving a
consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ . . . by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))).
372
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27–28 (2003) (holding that the question of
whether a statutorily authorized prison sentence furthers one of the purposes of punishment
was “appropriately directed at the legislature,” not the Court); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1003–04 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(advocating “rational basis” review of statutorily authorized prison sentences).
373
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–45 (2008) (invalidating death penalty
for rape of a child because the Court believed it created “risks of overpunishment” and
might discourage reporting of this crime); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (striking down the death
penalty for juveniles on the ground that it did not adequately further goals of retribution or
deterrence); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (2002) (striking down the death penalty for the
mentally retarded on the ground that it did not adequately further goals of retribution or
deterrence). The Court recently refused to give deference to the legislature in a case
involving life sentences without possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010). It is unclear whether Graham
signals a more general willingness on the Court’s part to engage in proportionality review of
prison sentences without giving automatic deference to the legislature. The Supreme Court’s
two-track approach to proportionality review in death penalty and prison cases is discussed
in Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009).
374
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (“Such penalties for such
offenses amaze those who . . . believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
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started asking whether the punishment furthered the goal of deterrence as
well as retribution, but this inquiry remained formally separate from the
Court’s proportionality analysis.375 The Court never upheld a punishment
on the ground that it deterred crime,376 and it never even suggested that a
should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“It is generally agreed that punishment should be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.”); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (stating that the severity of the punishment should be compared to the
gravity of the offense “made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(“It is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than
causing the same harm unintentionally.’” (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) (“This Court has
on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (“Rape is
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve
the unjustified taking of human life.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding
that the death penalty is an “extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes”);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime.”); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,
340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that the state’s power to punish is limited by the
severity of the crime: “The state may . . . make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offense
to be punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count the
drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand offenses, and thus extend the
punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost indefinite
duration.”).
375
See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 187 (determining first whether the death penalty for
homicide was “totally without penological justification” in terms of retribution and
deterrence, and then determining whether the punishment was “disproportionate in relation
to the crime for which it was imposed”).
376
The closest the Court came to upholding a punishment on the ground that it furthered
the goal of deterrence was the Court’s suggestion in several cases that the lack of evidence
concerning the deterrent effect of a given punishment meant that the Court should defer to
the legislature’s judgment. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (“[I]t
is not demonstrable that no 16-year-old is . . . significantly deterred [by the death penalty]. It
is rational, even if mistaken, to think the contrary.”), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551;
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184–85 (upholding the death penalty for intentional murder in part
because “[s]tatistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to
crimes by potential offenders have . . . been inconclusive”). In one case during this period,
the Court used an apparent lack of deterrent effect as a partial justification for invalidating a
punishment, but this decision was based on the Court’s own speculation rather than
empirical evidence. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798–99 (“We are quite unconvinced, however,
that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one
who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken. Instead, it seems
likely that ‘capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation.’” (citation omitted)). In all of these cases, the Court’s
judgment about the legal effect of deterrence mirrored the Court’s judgment regarding the

2012]

PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CULPABILITY

719

punishment that was grossly disproportionate to the offender’s culpability
could be upheld because it furthered the ends of deterrence. In a number of
cases, the Court failed even to mention deterrence or any other utilitarian
theory of punishment.377
Culpability remained the touchstone of
proportionality review.
This all changed with Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in
Harmelin v. Michigan.378 Harmelin was sentenced to a mandatory term of
life imprisonment as the result of his conviction for possessing in excess of
650 grams of cocaine, despite the fact that he had no prior convictions.379
He appealed his sentence on the ground that it was so disproportionate to
his offense that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.380 The
Supreme Court was split as to his claim. Four Justices thought the
punishment was unconstitutionally disproportionate.381 Two Justices
refused even to reach this question, arguing that the Constitution does not
prohibit excessive prison sentences.382 Justice Kennedy, writing for himself
and two other Justices, denied Harmelin’s claim while purporting to
preserve the Court’s capacity to engage in proportionality review.383 His
opinion stated that the Court should “adhere[] to the narrow proportionality
principle” he saw in the Court’s prior cases.384
The focus of Justice Kennedy’s opinion was deference to the
legislature. It emphasized the legislature’s greater institutional competence
to make decisions regarding sentences,385 the need to preserve the flexibility
of the federal system,386 and the need for the Court to base its
proportionality decisions on “objective” standards.387 It advocated use of
defendant’s culpability. In none of these cases did the Court examine data concerning the
deterrent effect of the challenged punishment. In short, even though the Court started
mentioning deterrence as one of the primary aims of punishment, none of its decisions
upholding a punishment prior to 1990 were based on that punishment’s deterrent effect.
377
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (focusing on whether the mentally
retarded as a group can be said to lack culpability necessary for imposition of the death
penalty); Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (focusing on the disproportionality between the defendant’s
culpability for uttering a ‘no account’ check and imposition of a life sentence); Coker, 433
U.S. 584 (focusing on whether the commission of rape evinces sufficient culpability to
justify imposition of the death penalty).
378
501 U.S. 957 (1990).
379
Id. at 961.
380
Id.
381
See id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting), 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
382
See id. at 994 (majority opinion).
383
See id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
384
Id. at 996–97.
385
Id. at 998.
386
Id. at 999–1000.
387
Id. at 1000.
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the “rational basis” test for reviewing legislative decisions regarding
sentences.388 Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, the opinion
argued that legislatures should be free to choose from any of the four major
theories of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and
rehabilitation—in determining the punishment for a given crime.389 A
majority of the Court now adheres to this aspect of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.390
The Court’s decision to unmoor its proportionality jurisprudence from
the culpability principle radically changed the very concept of
proportionality.391 Whereas a culpability-based approach to proportionality
asks whether the punishment is greater than the defendant deserves, the
three utilitarian approaches authorized by the Court simply ask whether the
punishment is useful to society.392 Deterrence-based proportionality asks
whether the punishment deters a sufficient quantity of crime to
counterbalance the pain it inflicts on the defendant. Incapacitation-based
proportionality asks whether the punishment prevents the defendant himself
from committing a sufficient quantity of crime to counterbalance the pain it
inflicts on him. Rehabilitation-based proportionality asks whether the
punishment sufficiently decreases the risk that the defendant will commit
further crimes once he is released.393
If legislatures are free to use any of the utilitarian theories of
punishment as the measure of proportionality, they are also free to impose

388

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 999.
390
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
391
A number of scholars in recent years have argued that the Court’s proportionality
jurisprudence under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause should focus on culpability
rather than utilitarian concerns. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699 (2005); Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163,
1218–22 (2009); Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 1. But see Alice
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 286
(2005) (asserting that proportionality is a principle of limited government independent of the
primary justifications for punishment).
392
See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 1, at 915–16.
393
See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 594 (2005)
(“Utilitarian theory also argues for punishment in proportion to past harm, but only when
this will prevent future similar crimes by this offender, through deterrence, incapacitation,
and/or rehabilitation, or prevent such crimes by others, through general deterrence and norm
reinforcement.”); cf. Francis Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 229 (1959) (noting that the
“rehabilitative ideal has often led to increased severity of penal measures”).
389
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punishment far in excess of the defendant’s culpability.394 This fact was
graphically illustrated in Ewing v. California.395 In Ewing, the defendant
was a small-time recidivist who was convicted of shoplifting three golf
clubs and was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison under
California’s “three strikes” law.396 Ewing appealed the sentence on the
ground that it was grossly disproportionate to the offense of shoplifting.397
A plurality of the Supreme Court decided against Ewing without even
considering whether he deserved this punishment as a retributive matter.
Rather, the plurality found that there was a rational basis for the
legislature’s judgment that this sentence would further the state’s interest in
deterrence and incapacitation.398 On the same day it decided Ewing, the
Court upheld a sentence of fifty-years-to-life for a defendant convicted of
shoplifting videotapes on two occasions.399 Since Ewing was decided,
lower courts have upheld sentences of twenty-five years to life for
recidivists who commit a crime as minor as stealing a slice of pizza. 400
Although Harmelin and Ewing purported to preserve proportionality
review, the review they preserved was exceedingly weak.
Ewing did not spell the end of proportionality review, but it did bring
such review to a new level of arbitrariness. As Ewing demonstrates, if the
primary question the Court is supposed to ask is whether there is a rational
basis for believing that a sentence furthers some goal of punishment, it is
hard to imagine a proportionality challenge that could ever succeed. And
yet the Court in recent years has struck down several punishments on the
ground that they were grossly disproportionate to the offense. These
punishments included the death penalty for the mentally retarded,401 for
minors,402 and for anyone convicted of a nonhomicide offense;403 a life
394
Indeed, because utilitarianism focuses on social benefit rather than individual desert,
it would permit in principle punishment of the innocent. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93 n.19 (1997) (“The main problem with
the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is that it potentially sacrifices the innocent in order
to achieve a collective good.”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1336, 1341 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (noting that the most “damaging”
critique of utilitarianism is that it “admits the possibility of justified punishment of the
innocent”).
395
538 U.S. 11 (2003).
396
Id. at 17–20.
397
Id. at 20.
398
See id. at 25–27.
399
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
400
See Jack Leonard, ‘Pizza Thief’ Walks the Line, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A1,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/10/local/la-me-pizzathief10-2010feb10.
401
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
402
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
403
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008).
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sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender;404 and a mandatory life
sentence for a juvenile homicide offender.405 To differentiate these cases
from the weak Harmelin–Ewing approach to proportionality, I will call
them the Court’s “strong proportionality” cases.
The result in each of the strong proportionality cases appears to have
been driven by the Supreme Court’s judgment that the offender was not
sufficiently culpable to deserve the punishment imposed.406 But because
culpability is no longer the official standard, the Court had to show that the
challenged punishments failed to further any legitimate goal of
punishment—especially deterrence, which the Court had described since
the 1970s as being comparable in importance to retribution. The Court
achieved this end in the strong proportionality cases by silently replacing
the rational basis test it had employed in Harmelin and Ewing with a much
less deferential standard of review. As in every other proportionality case
the Supreme Court has decided, no conclusive evidence was presented in
these cases as to whether the challenged punishment had a significant
deterrent effect. But whereas in cases such as Harmelin and Ewing, the
Supreme Court took the lack of evidence as a signal to defer to legislative
judgment, it drew precisely the opposite inference in the strong
proportionality cases. In these cases the Court took the lack of evidence as
a signal to engage in its own speculation about the possible deterrent effect
of the punishment. In each case, the Court concluded that there probably
was no such effect.407
404

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
406
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“[B]ecause juveniles have lessened culpability they
are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442 (“The goal
of retribution . . . does not justify the harshness of the death penalty here. In measuring
retribution, as well as other objectives of criminal law, it is appropriate to distinguish
between a particularly depraved murder that merits death as a form of retribution and the
crime of child rape.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 569 (“Capital punishment must be limited to
those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution. . . . [J]uvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient
to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”).
407
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29 (“Deterrence does not suffice to justify the
sentence either. . . . Because juveniles’ ‘lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of
responsibility . . . often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,’ they
are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.”
(quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441, 444
(noting that “it cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty for child rape serves
no deterrent . . . function,” but going on to speculate that “[w]ith respect to deterrence, if the
death penalty adds to the risk of non-reporting, that, too, diminishes the penalty’s
405
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In sum, the Supreme Court still uses proportionality review to protect
the values inherent in the culpability principle, but it does so in an
inconsistent and disingenuous manner.408 The weak proportionality cases
(Harmelin and Ewing) show that where the Court wants to uphold a
punishment it employs rational basis review and is willing to justify the
punishment even on purely utilitarian grounds. The strong proportionality
cases show that where the Court wishes to strike the punishment down, it
covertly uses a higher standard of review and focuses primarily on
culpability. This approach to proportionality review is not particularly
consistent with the idea of the rule of law—but until the Court finds a more
reliable way to measure punishment against culpability, it may be the best
we can get.
VII. CONCLUSION
With respect to constitutional criminal law, we still live in the
aftermath of the instrumentalist revolution. In the first half of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court adopted the instrumentalist rejection of
morality and tradition, allowing legislatures to authorize punishment with
no proof of culpability. This attitude toward constitutional criminal law
conflicted with the various protections the Constitution provides criminal
defendants, particularly the protection against Cruel and Unusual
Punishments. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Court has tried
to resolve this conflict by renewing its reliance on both morality and
tradition, but now in isolation from each other. The result has been the
development of constitutional doctrines that are either empty or too
disruptive to be workable. Although the Court currently seems to be trying
to find its way out of this dilemma, it has not yet done so—and will not be
able to do so until it returns to the common law synthesis of morality and
tradition that underlies constitutional criminal law.

objectives”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death
penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for
petitioner acknowledged at oral argument. . . . [T]he likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution
is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (“[I]t seems likely
that ‘capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation.’ . . . [T]hat sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the
spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded offenders.” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 799 (1982))).
408
Several scholars have noted that when the Supreme Court strikes down acts of
legislation without the guidance of a constitutional standard, this creates serious separation
of powers problems. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial
Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2006).

724

JOHN F. STINNEFORD

[Vol. 102

